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al  detail  will  be  published  in  larger  publications  in  2014-­2015.
Background  to  the  research
A  previous  study  of  616  respondents  showed  strong  support  for  a  reconciliation  and  trust-­building  
process  encompassing  a  broad  range  of  actors  in  the  population  (Wilkes  et  al,  2012).  This  was  most  
strongly  evident  amongst  citizens  who  identify  themselves  as  religious.  70-­80%  of  respondents  be-­
lieved  a  forward-­looking  reconciliation  process  would  be  important,  while  40-­50%  indicated  that  
engagement  with  the  country’s  past  is  important.
How  much  commitment  to  the  reconciliation  process  was  shared  across  the  population?  What  real  
steps  towards  major  change  do  citizens  support?  Would  this  pattern  of  support  be  shared  in  the  poor-­
est,  most  predominantly  monoethnic  cities  on  the  country’s  periphery?
This  second  survey  provides  the  most  solid  research  base  published  to  date  for  understanding  public  
feelings  about  reconciliation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Instead  of  framing  the  study  in  terms  of  





7KLV VHFRQG ODUJHU VWXG\ FRQ¿UPHG WKH VWUHQJWK RI VXSSRUW IRU UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ DQG WUXVWEXLOGLQJ
across  the  population,  and  particularly  amongst  more  religious  citizens.  This  time,  non-­religious  and  
less  religious  were  also  shown  to  be  more  favourable  to  activities  fostering  understanding  across  the  
constituent  peoples  than  the  average  across  the  sample.
75.4%  of  the  total  sample  indicated  that  a  serious  attempt  to  build  relationships  amongst  religious  
and  ethnic  groups  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  would  have  an  impact  on  the  future  of  the  country  
(77%  of  those  who  responded  to  the  question).  This  strong  support  was  repeated  across  a  number  
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of  questions  about  reconciliation.  A  much  smaller  proportion  of  respondents  saw  trust-­building  or  
reconciliation  initiatives  as  unimportant  or  very  unimportant.
Nevertheless,  most  respondents  (60.8%)  indicated  improving  the  economy  was  the  greatest  priority  
facing  the  country,  39.9%  believed  political  change  was  most  important,  and  only  29%  indicated  that  
improving  social  relationships  was  the  most  important  priority  for  the  country.  Respondents  could  
tick  more  than  one  option.
Respondents  support  real  concessions,  public  expenditure  and  support  for  the  vulnerable
The  results  showed  strong  public  support  for  public  money  to  be  spent  on  educational  activities  fos-­
tering  understanding,  appreciation  of  diversity  and  reconciliation  (84.4%),  and  on  recognition  and  
compensation  for  wartime  victims  in  their  locality  (71.4%).
By  contrast,  only  a  half  of  respondents  believed  that  a  formal  reconciliation  process  in  their  locality  
would  be  important  –  large  enough  to  be  important  to  local  politicians,  but  smaller  than  the  numbers  
who  expect  their  locality  to  provide  for  the  rights  of  victims  and  minorities  after  the  war.  A  propor-­
tion  of  respondents  were  indicating  their  belief  that  their  local  authorities  ought  to  extend  support  
and  protection  for  returnees  or  other  minorities,  but  did  not  judge  that  the  local  authorities  were  the  
appropriate  bodies  to  promote  reconciliation.
Engaging  with  the  past,  looking  to  the  future
0DQ\VWXGLHVRQUHFRQFLOLDWLRQFRQ¿QHWKHLUDWWHQWLRQWRDFWLYLWLHVIRFXVHGRQMXVWLFHDQGUHDFKLQJDQ
DJUHHGQDWLRQDOQDUUDWLYHDERXWWKHSDVW7KLVVXUYH\FRQ¿UPVWKHSDWWHUQVHWLQWKHSUHYLRXVVWXG\
Support  for  projects  building  understanding  and  focused  on  the  future  was  greater  than  support  for  
expert  examinations  of  the  causes  and  experience  of  the  war,  or  for  the  creation  of  memorials  at  sites  
of  war  crimes.
Nevertheless,  68.2%  indicated  it  was  important  or  very  important  for  a  process  of  trust-­building  to  
reach  agreement  on   the  historical   facts   relating   to   the  genocidal  programme,  and  64.7%  saw  it  as  
important  to  arrive  at  agreement  on  those  historical  facts  which  show  the  extent  to  which  all  sides  
VXIIHUHGGXULQJWKHFRQÀLFW)DUPRUHWKDQPLJKWEHH[SHFWHGWKHVH¿JXUHVKHOGDFURVVWKHFLWLHVUHS-­
resented  in  the  survey.  Again,  approximately  half  of  the  sample  indicated  that  reconciliation  activities  
addressing  the  past  were  important  or  very  important  for  the  country’s  future.





single  national  group  were   the  most  highly   rated  potential  participants   in  a   reconciliation  process  
(viewed  as  important  or  very  important  to  the  process  by  67.2%  and  72.7%  respectively).
3ROLWLFLDQVDQGUHOLJLRXVOHDGHUVZHUHDJDLQVHHQDVLPSRUWDQWE\VPDOOHUWKRXJKVLJQL¿FDQWSURSRU-­
tions  of  the  sample  who  completed  the  questionnaire  (48.6%  and  54.3%).  Though  respondents  were  
far  less  positive  about  the  potential  role  to  be  played  by  politicians,  they  were  also  strongly  in  favour  
of  a  reconciliation  and  trust-­building  process  in  which  politicians  seriously  engaged  with  the  opin-­
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   1.  Executive  Summary
ions  of  ordinary  people  (72.7%).  Many  respondents  may  have  low  levels  of  trust  in  political  parties,  
but  recognize  that  they  could  be  a  part  of  effective  reconciliation  activities.
5HVSRQGHQWVLQGLFDWHGJUHDWHUFRQ¿GHQFHLQRWKHUFLYLOVRFLHW\DFWRUVLQWKLVVXUYH\WKDQLQWKHSUH-­
vious  survey.  NGOs  representing  victims  and  the  vulnerable  and  women  were  credited  as  important  
for  a  reconciliation  process  by  63.1%  and  57.4%  respectively,  more  than  indicated  political  or  reli-­
gious  leaders  are  important.
Respondents  place  most  value  on  a  country-­wide  reconciliation  process
75.4%  indicated  that  a  serious  attempt  to  build  relationships  amongst  religious  and  ethnic  groups  in  
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  would  have  an  impact  on  the  future  of  the  country.  A  reconciliation  process  
at  local  level  or  involving  Serbia  and  Croatia  was  far  less  important  across  the  sample,  though  both  
were  still  recognized  as  important  to  them  by  substantial  proportions  (49.6%  and  61%,  or  50.7%  
and  62.2%  of  those  who  responded  to  the  question).  In  cities  across  the  country,  the  importance  of  
reconciliation  activities  at  the  country  or  state  level  was  considerably  greater  than  local  or  regional  
processes,  regardless  of  which  political  parties  are  strong  in  those  cities.
More  striking  than  geographical  differences  were  the  similarities  across  all  cities
More  noteable  than  the  differences  between  respondents  from  different  cities  was  the  striking  sim-­
ilarity  in  their  responses,  across  all  13  cities.  Where  city-­level  responses  were  less  enthusiastic  or  
more  enthusiastic  than  the  country-­wide  average,  it  was  often  only  by  a  slight  variation.  There  were  
no   cities   in  which   the   population   sampled   appeared   to   be   dominated   by   uncompromising   hard-­
OLQHRSLQLRQWKRXJKLQVRPH±%LMHOMLQDIRULQVWDQFH±VLJQL¿FDQWO\PRUHQRQFRPPLWWDODQGPRUH
negative  responses  were  received  than  nationally.  The  importance  of  arriving  at  agreement  on  the  
historical  facts  about  the  genocidal  programme  in  the  1990s  was  as  strong  in  Banja  Luka  (73%)  and  
Srebrenica  (64.8%)  as  was  the  case  nationally.  The  13  cities  included  a  number  of  cities  not  associ-­
ated  in  public  discussion  with  strong  commitment  to  the  process  of  reconciliation,  perhaps  because  
they  are  more  mono-­ethnic,  impoverished,  located  on  the  country’s  periphery,  or  because  they  expe-­
rienced  the  most  extreme  forms  of  ethnic  cleansing  during  the  war.
Belief  in  the  importance  of  a  country-­wide  process  building  relationships  of  trust  and  honesty  across  
religious  and  ethnic  groups  was  nevertheless  noteably  stronger  in  Sarajevo  (87%)  and  in  Banja  Luka  
(82%)  than  in  Bijeljina  (64%).  Support  for  reconciliation  with  Croatia  and  Serbia  was  highest   in  
Mostar  (69%),  Trebinje  (70%),  Tuzla  (71%)  and  Sarajevo  (81%),  and  there  was  an  unusually  high  
level  of  support  for  a  local  reconciliation  process  in  Mostar  (55.5%),  Stolac  (65.3%)  and  Sarajevo  
(84.2%).
7KHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHUHVXOWVIURPHDFKFLW\DUHQRWVLPSOHUHÀHFWLRQVRIDQ\SDUWLFXODUIDFWRU
economic,  political,  national  or  geographical.  The   results  do  not   support   the  view   that  economic  
progress  will  by  itself  do  away  with  the  need  for  a  deliberate  focus  on  reconciliation.  In  this  report,  
WKHUHVXOWVLQHDFKFLW\DSSHDUWRUHÀHFWGLVWLQFWLYHVHWVRIORFDOFRQGLWLRQVQRWDVLQJOHSDWWHUQRUD
¿[HGJHRJUDSKLFDOGLYHUJHQFH
National  and  religious  identity:  not  perceived  as  obstacles  to  change
44.9%  of  respondents  say  that  a  sense  of  national  identity  is  not  important  to  them,  and  a  very  small  
percentage  see  it  as  shaping  decisions  in  their  personal  lives  affecting  friendships  (7.4%).  Those  who  
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indicated  that  their  national  identity  affects  their  vote  nevertheless  were  as  likely  as  the  entire  sample  
were  to  indicate  high  levels  of  trust  in  the  role  to  be  played  by  individuals  who  advance  the  interests  
RIDOOFLWL]HQVDQGDUHQRWLGHQWL¿HGZLWKWKHLQWHUHVWVRIDQ\RQHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOH
Differences   between   the   respondents  who   identify  with   the   three   constituent   peoples  were   often  
slight.  A  consistent  pattern  of   striking  differences  distinguished  more   religious  and  non-­religious  
UHVSRQGHQWV5HVSRQGHQWVZKRLGHQWL¿HGWKHPVHOYHVDVPRUHUHOLJLRXVZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WRVXSSRUWD
public  reconciliation  process  and  one  which  would  address  issues  associated  with  the  past.  Muslim  
respondents  were  more  likely  than  Catholic  or  Orthodox  respondents  to  support  reconciliation  activ-­
ities  addressing  the  past  or  focused  on  the  needs  of  victims  and  minority  groups.  At  the  same  time,  
agnostics  and  atheists  were  more  likely  than  the  average  across  the  sample  to  support  educational  
and  dialogue  initiatives  which  are  designed  to  build  understanding  and  reconciliation  across  the  pop-­
XODWLRQV7KHVHGLIIHUHQFHVZHUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWEXWWKH\ZHUHQRWVRJUHDWWKDWDWWLWXGHVWR
reconciliation  should  be  conceived  of  as  greatly  different  between  the  constituent  peoples.
Personal  background  makes  some  groups  within  the  population  value  reconciliation  more  
strongly  than  others
Those  parts  of  the  population  most  strongly  in  favour  of  reconciliation  activities  included  pension-­
ers,  war  veterans,  women  and  workers  in  secure  full  employment.
More  detail  will  be  found  below  indicating  different  tendencies  which  correlate  with  political  vote  
(and  a  sizeable  proportion  of  the  sample  who  did  not  vote  in  the  last  elections),  with  majority-­minor-­
ity  status,  with  wartime  experience,  with  age,  and  with  levels  of  education  attained.
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   2.  Essential  Background  to  the  Research
2.  Essential  Background  to  the  Research
Research  objectives
This  survey  project  was  instituted  as  part  of  a  research  project  designed  to  show  the  grounds  for  
PRUHQXDQFHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIWKHQDWXUHRIDWWLWXGHVDQGLQÀXHQFHVRQDWWLWXGHVWRUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ
and  this  differentiates  the  study  from  one  commissioned  to  test  attitudes  to  a  particular  policy  or  to  
indicate  support  for  a  particular  agenda.
The  project  was  initiated  after  selected  consultations  with  civil  society  activists  and  academics  indi-­
cated  a  series  of  points  of  disagreement  over  the  state  of  popular  attitudes  to  reconciliation:
Ɣ Is  there  a  gap  between  popular  interest  in  reconciliation  and  the  interest  shown  by  the  religious  
and  political  leadership  and  the  media?  If  so,  why?
Ɣ Is  there  a  clear  popular  understanding  of  what  a  reconciliation  process  entails  shared  amongst  
the  diverse  religious  and  secular  populations  across  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  or  is  this  better  
seen  as  a  subject  about  which  there  is  marked  disagreement  or  confusion?  Is  it  overshadowed  
by  the  political  debate  over  different  constitutional  futures  for  the  country,  and  for  its  constitu-­
ent  peoples?  Does  the  population  believe  reconciliation  is  worth  greater  public  commitments?
Ɣ What  are  the  preferred  frameworks  for  thinking  about  a  better  future  for  the  country:  Political  
or  economic  change?  Reconciliation?  Peace?  Justice?  Social  repair?  The  creation  of  public  
trust  or  of  new  relationships  across  different  communities?  The  creation  of  new  reasons  for  
SXEOLFWUXVWLQSROLWLFDOOHDGHUVWKHPHGLDDQGUHOLJLRXV¿JXUHV"*UHDWHUDFFHSWDQFHRIGLIIHU-­
ence  or  greater  acceptance  of  commonality  across  difference  within  the  population?  How,  if  at  
all,  is  facing  the  past  together  understood  to  be  related  to  facing  the  future  together?
Ɣ What  is  expected  of  politicians  in  this  process?  And  journalists?
Ɣ Is  the  involvement  of  religion  helpful  or  a  hindrance  for  reconciliation  activities?  Are  citizens  
more  interested  in  embracing  diversity,  or  more  concerned  to  avoid  the  harmful  effects  iden-­
WL¿HGZLWKGLYLVLRQ"
Ɣ ,VVXSSRUWIRUUHFRQFLOLDWLRQPRVWFOHDUO\LGHQWL¿HGZLWKDQHGXFDWHGUHODWLYHO\DIÀXHQWHOLWH
living  in  large  cities?  What  is  the  state  of  opinion  in  smaller,  poorer,  more  predominantly  mo-­
noethnic  cities?
The  survey  questionnaire  contains  a   series  of  questions  about   social   relations,   the  public   sphere,  
politics,  welfare,  education  and  personal  outlook.  It  is  designed  to  open  room  for  new  perspectives  
on  the  state  of  public  interest  in  reconciliation  as  a  process  made  up  of  a  diverse  range  of  activities,  
not  simply  to  test  public  attitudes  to  a  single  concept  or  mechanism.  Respondents  were  asked  to  state  
whether  they  see  political,  economic  and  social  change  as  priorities:  it  was  not  assumed  that  there  is  
a  clearly  understood  need  for  particular  changes.
The  project  builds  on  a  number  of  previous  studies  which  focus  on  particular  aspects  on  the  recon-­
ciliation  process,  on  attitudes  between  different  parts  of  the  population,  and  on  the  role  of  religion  in  
public  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Further  details  will  be  found  in  the  bibliography.
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The  results  will  be  the  subject  of  public  discussions  across  the  country  in  2014,  and  the  full  range  of  
UHVSRQVHVZKLFKKHOSWRFODULI\IXUWKHUWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHVXUYH\¿QGLQJVZLOOIHHGLQWRWKHDFDGHP-­
ic  publications  which  conclude  this  phase  of  the  study.
Key  terms
‘Reconciliation’  and  ‘Trust  Building’
Across  the  world,  states  face  issues  associated  with  social  and  political  divisions  –  this  is  not  a  prob-­
lem  arising  only  from  the  country’s  distinctive  past.
The  terms  ‘reconciliation’  and  ‘trust-­building’  are  not  chosen  to  imply  a  particular  idealistic  solution  
or  agenda  is  needed  for  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina’s  problems,  nor  to  imply  that  Bosnia  and  Herzego-­
YLQDVXIIHUVIURPDFOHDUO\LGHQWL¿HGVHWRISUREOHPVGHULYHGIURPWKHZDURUIURPWKH&RPPXQLVW
era.




involving  a  selection  of  perpetrators  and  victims,  instead  of  the  reality  and  needs  of  the  wider  pop-­
XODWLRQLWVPHDQLQJDVDFRQFUHWHSURFHVVLVYDJXHLQSDUWEHFDXVHGLIIHUHQWUHOLJLRXVOLWHUDWXUHV
and  communities  present  reconciliation  as  a  goal  or  as  an  imperative  instead  of  as  a  process.  Sup-­
porters  of  the  term  often  acknowledge  these  problems  (Philpott  2012).
Reconciliation  is  used  here  as  a  term  which  implies  activities,  practices  and  processes  involving  the  
building  of  relationships,  both  ‘horizontal’  relationships  across  the  wider  population  and  ‘vertical’  
relationships,  begging  questions  about  the  perception  of  a  need  for  accountability  between  represent-­
DWLYHVDQGWKHSRSXODWLRQVWKH\VHHNWRUHSUHVHQW8QOLNHµWUDQVLWLRQDOMXVWLFH¶µUHFRQFLOLDWLRQ¶GRHV
not  assume  that  a  particular  judicial  mechanism  or  a  focus  on  a  set  of  perpetrators  and  victims  will  
OHDGWRDFKDQJHLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VVRFLDORUSROLWLFDOGHYHORSPHQW8QOLNHµSHDFHEXLOGLQJ¶µUHFRQFLOL-­
ation’  does  not  imply  the  primary  problem  facing  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  a  threat  to  social  or  po-­
litical  peace.  The  survey  addresses  some  potential  limitations  of  using  ‘reconciliation’  as  a  framing  
device  through  questions  testing  attitudes  to  all  of  the  four  points  above.
‘Reconciliation’  is  paired  in  a  series  of  questions  with  ‘trust-­building’  in  order  to  press  respondents  
into  considering  two  practical  dimensions  of  the  reconciliation  process:  the  actors  and  communities  
LQZKLFKWKH\KDYHFRQ¿GHQFHDQGWKHDFWRUVDQGFRPPXQLWLHVLQZKLFKWKH\KDYHDORZOHYHORI
trust.
One  of  the  most  useful  contributions  to  the  literature  on  post-­war  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (Stover  
and  Weinstein  2004)  uses  ‘social  repair’  as  an  alternative  term,  on  the  basis  that  the  need  for  mending  
society  is  more  readily  accepted  than  the  term  ‘reconciliation’  is.  In  our  previous  survey,  both  terms  
received  roughly  equal  appreciation  from  respondents.  The  present  survey  included  a  series  of  ques-­
tions  probing  attitudes  to  the  need  for  social,  political  and  economic  change.
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‘Constituent  peoples’,  ‘minorities’  and  ‘national  identity’
7KHDFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUHRQQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\LQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDUHÀHFWVDYLEUDQWLQWHOOHFWXDO
debate,  over  and  on  top  of  the  highly  politicised  public  debate  on  the  topic.  This  survey  was  designed  
WRUHÀHFWDQRSHQDSSURDFKWRUHVSRQGHQWV¶RZQGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHLULGHQWLW\DQGUHSUHVHQWVWKHODUJ-­
est  survey  on  the  subject  to  date  which  allows  for  contextualised  representations  of  popular  identity  
across  different  regions,  religious  groups  and  economic  classes.
The  survey  gave  respondents  the  opportunity  to  indicate  whether  they  identify  with  one  of  the  three  
FRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHVLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDRUWRGH¿QHWKHLULGHQWLW\XVLQJWKHWHUPVWKH\SUHIHU
to  use.  Questions  are  also  included  which  gave  respondents  scope  for  indicating  whether  this  identity  
was  important  to  their  public,  political  and  private  lifestyle  choices.
A  question  also  addressed  whether  respondents  identify  themselves  as  part  of  a  minority.  Constitu-­
tionally,  citizens  who  identify  as  part  of  the  Bosniak  or  Bosnian  Muslim,  Croatian  or  Serbian  peo-­
ples  are  not  minorities,  even  if  they  are  living  in  an  area  where  that  part  of  the  population  is  small  
in  numbers.  Respondents  from  all  backgrounds  were  free  to  choose  to  identify  as  part  of  a  minority,  
and  results  are  reported  below.
‘Religious’  and  ‘non-­religious’
This  represents  the  largest  survey  relating  to  religion  in  the  country  since  the  1980s,  when  a  study  
was  conducted  of  over  4000  respondents  (a  study  based  on  the  results  was  published  in  a  special  
OLPLWHGHGLWLRQGXULQJWKHZDU%DNLü
The  present  questionnaire  included  questions  about  the  ways  in  which  respondents  described  them-­
selves  in  relation  to  religious  and  non-­religious  identities,  how  often  they  attended  religious  activ-­
ities  (if  at  all),  and  what  their  attitude  was  to  religious  belief.  A  range  of  options  was  given  which  
HQDEOHGUHVSRQGHQWVWRLQGLFDWHWKDWWKH\ZHUHGH¿QLWHO\UHOLJLRXVDJQRVWLFRUDWKHLVWRUVRPHWKLQJ
in  between.  Survey  respondents  were  also  able  to  describe  themselves  as  spiritual  rather  than  reli-­
gious.  The  results  should  not  be  seen  as  an  attempt  to  divide  the  population  into  ‘religious’  and  ‘not  
religious’,  or  ‘traditionally  religious’  and  ‘liberal’.  The  survey  did  not  ask  respondents  if  they  were  
opposed  to  clergy  or  other  religious  actors  being  involved  in  reconciliation  activities,  nor  whether  
they  opposed  atheist  or  other  non-­religious  actors  in  reconciliation  activities.
In   describing   the   involvement   of   ‘religious’   actors   in   reconciliation   activities,   the   survey   distin-­
guished  ‘religious  leaders’  and  ‘sincere  lay  believers  who  play  active  social  roles’.  The  notion  of  the  
‘sincere  lay  believer’  can  be  understood  in  many  different  ways,  and  who  is  to  be  included  in  the  
FDWHJRU\µUHOLJLRXVOHDGHU¶FDQDOVREHDVXEMHFWRIGLVDJUHHPHQW7KLVVXUYH\ZDVQRWDLPHGDWGH¿Q-­
ing  a  particular  approach  to  religion,  nor  to  suggest  that  religion  must  be  deployed  in  reconciliation  
activities  because  of  any  particular  hypothesis  about  religion  and  secularism.
Research  Methodology  and  Sample  Description
This  survey  was  conducted  as  a  part  of  the  project  “The  role  of  religious  communities  in  the  reconcil-­
LDWLRQSURFHVVLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD´³8ORJDYHUVNLK]DMHGQLFDXSURFHVXSRPLUHQMDX%RVQLL
+HUFHJRYLQL´RI WKH8QLYHUVLW\RI(GLQEXUJKDQGWKH&HQWHUIRU(PSLULFDO5HVHDUFKRI5HOLJLRQLQ
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  present  survey  is  a  follow-­up  to  the  2012  pilot  survey  published  as:  “Rec-­
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onciliation  and  Trust  Building  in  Bosnia-­Herzegovina,  A  Survey  of  Popular  Attitudes  in  Four  Cities  and  
Regions:  Bana  Luka,  Bugojno,  Mostar  and  Sarajevo”  (Wilkes  et  al.,  2012).
Sample
In  this  survey,  we  covered  13  cities:  Sarajevo,  Mostar,  Banja  Luka,  Stolac,  Jajce,  Tuzla,  Srebrenica,  
/LYQR%LMHOMLQD%UþNR7UHELQMH%LKDüDQG7HVOLü7KHFLWLHVZHUHFKRVHQWRHQFRPSDVVDOOUHJLRQV
cities  of  different  sizes,  cities  with  more  predominantly  monoethnic  and  more  mixed  populations,  
and  cities  dominated  by  Bosniak,  Croatian  and  Serbian  populations.
The   number   of   respondents  was   assigned   to   cities   by   size,   such   that   Sarajevo,   Banja   Luka   and  
0RVWDUZHUHDOORFDWHGUHVSRQGHQWVHDFK7UHELQMH%LKDüDQG7HVOLüUHVSRQGHQWVHDFKDQG
other  towns  200  respondents  each.  50%  of  respondents  live  in  large  cities  (population  over  80,000  
residents),  35%  live  in  small  cities  (population  below  25,000),  and  15%  live  in  a  medium-­size  city  
(between  25,000  and  80,000).
In  choosing  cities  in  which  to  conduct  the  survey,  account  was  taken  of  their  position  in  relation  to  
neighboring  countries.  Thus,  62%  of  respondents  come  from  the  central  part  of  the  country  and  38%  




from  a  nearby  city  (up  to  60  km  away),  and  17%  had  been  born  in  a  city  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  




The  questionnaire  was  designed  by  a   research   team  to  comprise  questions   relating   to  general   in-­
IRUPDWLRQDERXW UHVSRQGHQWVTXHVWLRQV UHODWHG WR UHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQDQGEHOLHIDWWLWXGHV WR UHF-­
onciliation  and  to  the  experience  of  respondents  during  the  war.  The  questions  were  mostly  of  the  
closed-­ended  type,  with  a  possibility  to  choose  one  of  the  given  options  or  to  not  answer  the  ques-­
tion.  The  number  of  variables  was  78.  The  questionnaire  was  printed  in  three  languages:  Bosnian,  
Croatian  and  Serbian.
The  Time  of  Conducting  the  Survey
Field  research  lasted  between  1  April  and  2  July  2013.  Most  questionnaires  were  completed  in  May,  
after  which  data  entry  and  SPSS  processing  commenced.
Sex/Gender
The  survey  was  conducted  on  a  sample  of  2,606  respondents,  of  whom  1,281  were  male  (49%)  and  
1,316  female  (51%).
National  Identity  and  Majority/Minority  Status
The  survey  was  administered  so  that  the  diversity  of  contexts  in  which  citizens  from  Bosniak,  Croat,  
Serb  and  minority  backgrounds  could  be  encompassed.  Interviewers  deliberately  encompassed  areas  in  
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cities  with  a  higher  concentration  of  people  belonging  to  the  smaller  of  the  local  constituent  peoples,  
in  order  to  make  this  diversity  of  background  and  opinion  visible.  Consequently,  the  sample  in  our  sur-­
YH\GRHVQRWUHÀHFWWKHSURSRUWLRQVLQZKLFKWKHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHVDUHIRXQGLQWKHSRSXODWLRQDVD
ZKROH&URVVLQJWKHQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\YDULDEOHZLWKWKHFLW\ZKHUHWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHVZHUH¿OOHGRXWZH
obtained  a  result  that  66%  of  respondents  identify  with  the  constituent  people  which  is  the  majority  in  
their  city  and  34%  of  respondents  belong  to  national  group  which  is  a  minority  (statistically,  not  legally)  
LQWKHLUFLW\,QDQVZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQKRZWKH\LGHQWLI\WKHPVHOYHVLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\LGHQWL¿HG
WKHPVHOYHVDV%RVQLDNDV6HUEDQGDV&URDW7KHQXPEHURIWKRVHZKRLGHQWL¿HGDV&URDW
is  proportionally  larger  than  in  the  general  population,  following  the  methodology  outlined  above.  The  
RWKHURIUHVSRQGHQWVEHORQJWRDQDWLRQDOPLQRULW\RUFKRVHWKHRSWLRQQRWWRGHFODUHDQLGHQWL¿FDWLRQ
in  response  to  the  survey  question.
Religion
,QD(XURSHDQSHUVSHFWLYH%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDLVDUHODWLYHO\UHOLJLRXVVRFLHW\RIUHVSRQG-­
ents  declared  they  were  religious,  of  whom  36.7%  indicated  that  religion  was  a  very  important  part  
of   their   life,  35.3%  that   it  was   important,  while  10.5%  were  explicitly  non-­religious.  The  survey  
revealed  that  a  large  part  of  the  population  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  believed  in  God  –  approxi-­
PDWHO\VLJQL¿FDQWO\DERYHWKH(XURSHDQDYHUDJHZKLFKLVVOLJKWO\DERYHDFFRUGLQJWR
WKHUHVXOWVRI(XUREDURPHWHU3ROO2IWKHUHPDLQLQJEHOLHYHWKDWWKHUHLVVRPHNLQG
of  spirit  or  life  energy  and  prefer  to  indicate  that  they  are  not  certain  as  to  whether  that  is  God.  3%  of  
respondents  are  agnostic  (choosing  the  option  ‘maybe  God  does  exist,  maybe  not’),  3%  are  atheists  
who  do  not  believe  in  God  or  in  any  kind  of  spiritual  or  supernatural  power,  approximately  3%  say  
they  have  never  thought  about  it,  and  another  3%  preferred  not  to  answer  the  question.
If  we  compare  responses  about  faith  in  God  to  responses  about  how  active  respondents  are  in  their  
church,  mosque  or  religious  community,  it  is  striking  that  only  24%  of  those  who  believe  in  God  are  
regularly  active  in  their  local  religious  community.  A  further  26%  of  those  who  believe  in  God  are  
sometimes  active,  and  40%  say  that  they  only  rarely  attend  church  or  mosque.  A  further  151  of  the  
2,606  respondents  said  that  they  believed  in  God  but  never  went  to  church  or  mosque,  approximately  
7,5%  of  the  sample.  This  could  be  described  as  a  segment  of  the  population  which  believes  without  
belonging   to  any   religious  community   in   the   full   sense   (a  statement  about   their   religiosity,  not  a  
statement  about  their  ethnic  identity).
The  survey  reveals  the  reverse  phenomenon  as  well:  belonging  without  believing.  Among  those  who  
do  not  believe  that  God  exists  or  that  any  other  spiritual  force  or  something  supernatural  does  –  those  
who  indicated  that  they  were  atheists  –  there  are  those  who  visit  church  or  mosque  every  now  and  
then,  albeit  infrequently.  Among  agnostics,  47%  go  to  church  or  mosque,  albeit  rarely,  and  11%  de-­
scribe  themselves  as  sometimes  active  in  their  religious  community.
5HVSRQVHVLQGLFDWLQJDQDI¿OLDWLRQZLWKUHOLJLRXVWUDGLWLRQVUHYHDOHGWKHVDPSOHZDVFRPSULVHGRI
35.0%  Muslims,  30.7%  Orthodox,  23.8%  Catholics,  1.9%  agnostics,  3.4%  atheists,  1.5%  members  
of  other  churches  and  religious  communities,  and  2.7%  chose  not  to  respond  to  this  question.  Thus,  
our  sample  included  more  Catholics  than  are  present  in  the  population  of  the  country  as  whole,  ac-­
cording  to  accessible  data.  Again,  this  was  for  the  methodological  reasons  noted  above.  Almost  a  
quarter,  22.5%,  of  respondents  indicated  that  they  felt  that  they  were  a  minority  in  a  religious  sense,  
69.8%  felt  that  they  were  part  of  a  majority,  and  7.7%  preferred  not  to  answer.
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80.9%  of  respondents  indicated  that  all  members  of  their  immediate  family  belonged  to  the  same  
religious  tradition,  compared  to  17.5%  who  stated  that  they  live  in  a  “mixed  family”.  This  points  to  a  
VLJQL¿FDQWKRPRJHQHLW\RIIDPLO\OLIH&RPSDULQJUHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQDQGIDPLO\KRPRJHQHLW\KHW-­
HURJHQHLW\ZH¿QGWKDWWKHVDPSOHIURPWKHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHZKLFKLVRQDYHUDJHOHDVWUHOLJLRXVO\
mixed  is  the  Bosniak  sample.  In  immediate  families  of  Bosniak  respondents,  11%  include  members  
who  do  not  belong  to  the  same  religious  tradition.  In  immediate  families  of  respondents  who  identify  
as  Serb,  this  is  13%,  and  among  those  who  identify  as  Croat  22%.  In  the  immediate  families  of  re-­
spondents  from  national  minorities,  44%  do  not  belong  to  the  same  religious  tradition.  Among  those  
who  gave  a  written  answer  as  an  alternative  instead  of  choosing  one  of  the  main  categories  listed  
for  national  identity,  58%  have  religiously  mixed  families  –  their  families  are  predominantly  inter-­
UHOLJLRXV6LJQL¿FDQWO\RIWKRVHZKRGLGQRWZDQWWRLQGLFDWHWKHLUQDWLRQDOLW\KDYHUHOLJLRXVO\
mixed  families.  31%  of  respondents  who  did  not  want  to  answer  the  question  on  family  homogeneity  
did  not  answer  the  question  on  national  identity.  29%  of  Serb  respondents  did  not  want  to  say  if  they  
had  a  religiously  mixed  family,  26%  of  Bosniak  respondents,  and  10%  of  Croat  respondents.
In  the  immediate  families  of  agnostics  and  atheists,  53%  and  59%  do  not  belong  to  the  same  reli-­
gious  tradition.  This  is  still  more  true  of  those  who  chose  “Other”  when  asked  about  their  religious  
DI¿OLDWLRQGRQRWEHORQJWRWKHVDPHUHOLJLRXVWUDGLWLRQ$PRQJWKRVHZKRGLGQRWZDQWWR
GHFODUHWKHLUUHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQPRUHFRPHIURPUHOLJLRXVO\PL[HGIDPLOLHVDQGWKHPDMRULW\FKRVH
not  to  indicate  whether  their  family  was  an  interreligious  one.  Among  those  who  did  not  want  to  
GHFODUHWKHLUUHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQWKHPDMRULW\KDYHUHOLJLRXVO\PL[HGIDPLOLHVDQGGRQRW
Among  those  who  did  not  answer  the  question  about  the  religious  homogeneity  or  heterogeneity  of  
their  family,  31%  are  Orthodox,  21%  Muslims,  7%  Catholics,  5%  atheists,  and  5%  ‘Other’.  26%  did  
QRWZDQWWRUHVSRQGWRWKHTXHVWLRQRQUHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQ
RIUHVSRQGHQWVLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\DUHQRWPHPEHUVRIDPLQRULW\GH¿QHGLQUHOLJLRXVWHUPV
and  that  their  immediate  family  are  members  of  the  same  religious  tradition.  18%  indicated  that  they  
DUHPHPEHUVRIDUHOLJLRXVPLQRULW\DQGHYHU\RQHLQWKHLULPPHGLDWHIDPLO\LGHQWL¿HVZLWKWKHVDPH
religious  tradition.  15%  of  respondents  do  not  feel  that  they  are  part  of  a  religious  minority  and  in-­
dicated  that  their  immediate  family  is  interreligious.  7%  feel  that  they  belong  to  a  religious  minority  
DQGLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\KDYHDUHOLJLRXVO\PL[HGIDPLO\,WLVVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWWKDWWKRVHZKRGR
feel  they  are  part  of  a  religious  minority  have  13%  more  religiously-­mixed  families  than  those  who  
do  not  feel  they  are  a  part  of  a  religious  minority.  The  difference  is  9%  if  we  count  only  members  of  
the  traditional  churches.
Age
The  largest  group  of  respondents  are  between  18  and  30  years  old  (38%),  followed  by  older  respond-­
ents  (above  51),  at  25%.  This  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  survey  was  conducted  in  urban  
areas  in  public,  frequented  by  young  people.  It  may  also  have  been  the  case  that  younger  and  older  
SHUVRQVZHUHPRUHZLOOLQJWRFRRSHUDWHZLWKLQWHUYLHZHUVDQGWR¿OOLQWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHZKLFKWRRN
a  lot  of  time  due  to  its  size.  19%  of  respondents  fell  in  the  group  between  31  and  40  years  of  age,  
14%  were  41  to  50,  and  6%  were  younger  than  18  years  old.
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   2.  Essential  Background  to  the  Research
Family  and  Economic  Status
Marital  status  of  respondents  is  as  follows:  45%  married,  44%  not  married,  4%  divorced,  5%  wid-­
owed,  and  2%  other.  The  number  of  members  of  the  household  in  which  a  respondent  lives  is  most  
IUHTXHQWO\IRXURU¿YHWKHQWZRRUWKUHHWKHQPRUHWKDQ¿YHDQGRIUH-­
spondents  live  alone.
Asked  about  their  employment  status,  35%  of  respondents  indicated  that  they  have  permanent  em-­
ployment,  while  13%  work  part-­time  and  have  temporary  employment.  The  number  of  unemployed  
in  our  sample  was  834  respondents,  or  32%  of  the  total.  8%  are  students  who  do  not  work  and  7%  
are  pensioners.  Asked  about  their  monthly  income,  the  highest  proportion  of  respondents  (42%)  in-­
GLFDWHGWKDWWKH\UHFHLYHEHWZHHQDQG.0DSSUR[LPDWHO\RU(XURV
25%  earn  less  than  500  KM  per  month,  and  23%  of  respondents  earn  1,000  to  2,000  KM.  10%  of  
respondents  receive  a  monthly  income  of  more  than  2,000  KM.
Education
Looking  at  the  levels  of  education  attained  by  the  survey  sample,  the  majority  of  respondents  gradu-­
DWHGIURPVHFRQGDU\VFKRROKDYHDFROOHJHRUXQLYHUVLW\GLSORPD¿QLVKHGHOHPHQ-­
tary  school,  3%  earned  a  master’s  or  doctorate,  while  only  1%  have  no  formal  education.  Looking  at  
the  levels  of  education  attained  separately  for  each  constituent  people  reveals  a  distinctive  feature  of  
the  sample.  Among  Croat  respondents,  38%  had  a  college  or  university  diploma,  whereas  this  was  
the  case  for  28%  of  Serbs  and  27%  of  Bosniaks.
Wartime  Experience
One  survey  question  raised  the  wartime  experience  of  respondents,  who  were  given  six  options:  sol-­
dier,  civilian,  refugee,  prison  camp  inmate,  “None  of  the  above”,  and  “I’d  rather  not  say”.  Respond-­
ents  could  choose  any  or  all  of  the  given  options,  or  could  choose  not  to  answer  the  question.  The  
largest  proportion  in  the  sample  indicated  that  they  had  been  refugees  (36.8%),  then  civilians  (26.2%),  
then  respondents  who  chose  “None  of  the  above”  (21%),  then  soldiers  (13.1%),  then  respondents  who  
chose  “I’d  rather  not  say”  (6.6%),  and  the  smallest  number  indicated  that  they  had  been  prison  camp  
inmates   (2.1%).  The  majority  of   those  who   indicated  “none  of   the  above”  were  younger   than  18,  
which  means  that  they  were  not  yet  born  during  the  war.
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3.  Attitudes  to  Reconciliation  and  Trust  Building:    
the  Results  in  Greater  Detail
A  series  of  questions  were  posed   in   the  survey,  placing  questions  about  building  relationships  of  
trust,  honesty  and  understanding,  about  trust-­building,  and  about  the  reconciliation  process,  in  the  
concrete  contexts  in  which  they  arise  in  public  life:
Ɣ First,  basic  questions  about  the  state  of  the  nation  and  personal  satisfaction,
Ɣ then  questions  about  which  issues  appear  most  important  for  reconciliation  activities,
Ɣ DQG¿QDOO\TXHVWLRQVDERXWZKLFKDFWRUVDUHPRVWUHOLHGXSRQWRDGYDQFHUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDF-­
tivities.
7KH UHVXOWV FRQ¿UP RXU HDUOLHU ¿QGLQJV DERXW D SXEOLF SUHIHUHQFH IRU IXWXUH RYHU SDVWRULHQWHG
processes,  and  about  a  preference  for  a  process  involving  a  wide  range  of  non-­political  actors  over  
political  acts  of  reconciliation  conducted  by  established  political  actors.  There  is  also  nuance  where  
respondents  have  indicated  particular  reckonings  with  the  past  are  a  priority  for  the  next  steps  in  rec-­
onciliation,  and  where  they  have  indicated  political  actors  can  gain  credit  through  embracing  change.  
7KH¿JXUHVDOVROHDYHURRPIRUGLIIHUHQFHVRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQRYHUH[DFWO\ZKDWOHYHORIFRPPLWPHQW
respondents  would  have  to  concrete  historical  and  political  work  respondents  given  that  future-­ori-­
ented  activities  draw  most  enthusiasm.
Question  19  and  20:  satisfaction  in  life  and  the  need  for  change  in  the  country
An  important  background  for  respondents’  assessments  about  the  need  for  trust-­building  or  recon-­






Herzegovina  is  to  improve,  and  considerably  less  –  28.7%  –  indicated  that  social  change  is  needed  if  
life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  to  improve.
Question  21:  The  impact  of  reconciliation  activities
Next  the  survey  required  participants  to  indicate  whether  a  serious  attempt  to  build  relationships  of  
trust  and  honesty  would  have  an  impact  on  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  75.4%  of  the  whole  sample  
(77%  of  those  who  answered  the  question)   indicated  that   they  believed  it  would  have  an  impact.  
Asked  the  same  question  about  their  own  city  and  the  surrounding  region,  49.6%  of  the  whole  sam-­
ple  believed  it  would  have  an  impact  (50.7%  of  those  who  answered  this  question).  This  response  did  
not  correlate  straightforwardly  with  responses  to  some  of  the  later  questions  in  the  survey  focused  
on  local  steps  towards  reconciliation,  as  will  be  seen  below,  at  which  point  a  higher  proportion  of  
respondents  signaled  that  these  steps  would  be  important.  At  a  wider  regional  level,  involving  BiH,  
Serbia  and  Croatia,  61%  of  the  sample  (62.2%  of  those  who  answered  this  question)  considered  that  
it  would  have  an  impact.  Approximately  2-­3%  of  the  sample  did  not  give  an  answer  to  these  ques-­
tions.
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   3.  Attitudes  to  Reconciliation  and  Trust  Building:  the  Results  in  Greater  Detail  
Question  22:  Should  reconciliation  work  focus  on  the  constituent  peoples?
Asked  whether  such  initiatives  should  focus  on  the  relationship  between  the  three  constituent  peo-­
ples   in  Bosnia   and  Herzegovina,   84.5%   said   ‘Yes’,   9.7%   ‘No’,   2.7%   ‘Other’   (the  most   popular  
written  response  being  ‘Constituent  Peoples  and  Minorities’,  at  1.3%),  and  3.9%  gave  no  response.
Question  23:  Should  initiatives  focus  on  the  historic  conduct  of  governments?
+RZLPSRUWDQWIRUWUXVWEXLOGLQJLQLWLDWLYHVDUHWRSLFVUHODWLQJWRSDVWJRYHUQPHQWV"DI¿UPHG
this  is  either  ‘Important’  or  ‘Very  Important’,  13.5%  indicated  that  ‘It  does  not  matter’,  and  17.1%  
DI¿UPHGWKDWWKHVHLVVXHVµ$UHD1XLVDQFH¶LQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\SUHIHUUHGQRWWRDQVZHUDQG
4.8%  did  not  respond  to  the  question).
Question  24:  What  issues  should  trust-­building  work  focus  upon?
Respondents  were  then  asked  to  respond  to  a  series  of  ten  questions  about  what  would  constitute  an  
appropriate  focus  for  an  initiative  which  builds  a  relationship  based  on  trust.
The  approach  to  a  trust-­building  process  deemed  more  important  than  any  other  by  the  majority  of  
respondents  would  be  one  which  gives  encouragement  to  school  children  to  talk  about  what  expec-­
tations  they  hold  in  common  for  their  futures:
The  next  most-­favoured  approach  to  a  trust-­building  process  would  ensure  that  political  leaders  en-­
gage  seriously  with  the  people  they  represent:
Graph  3.1.1    
ƚƌƵƐƚͲďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŝŶŝƟĂƟǀĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶ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The  response  was  considerably  less  positive  to  a  process  based  on  a  serious  encounter  between  im-­
SRUWDQWSROLWLFDOSHUVRQDOLWLHVKROGLQJRI¿FHWRGD\
5HVSRQGHQWVWRWKHVHTXHVWLRQVFRQVLVWHQWO\JDYHJUHDWHUDI¿UPDWLRQIRUSURFHVVHVZKLFKZRXOGOD\
a  basis  for  trust  through  dialogue  and  discussion  rather  than  through  legal  judgements,  expert  opin-­
LRQRUDSRORJLHVIURP¿JXUHVLQSRZHULQWKHV
Asked  about  the  importance  of  a  process  enabling  citizens  to  understand  each  others’  perspectives  
and  building  mutual  understanding,  a  solid  majority  saw  this  as  important  or  very  important,  and  
very  small  numbers  indicated  that  this  was  either  unimportant  or  very  unimportant:
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   3.  Attitudes  to  Reconciliation  and  Trust  Building:  the  Results  in  Greater  Detail  
Respondents  asked  to  rate  the  potential  contribution  of  religious  believers  with  a  sincere  and  per-­
sonal  faith  gave  responses  which  compare  favourably  with  the  expectations  placed  on  politicians:
$I¿UPDWLRQVRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIEDVLQJDWUXVWEXLOGLQJSURFHVVRQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIWKHWUXWK
about  wartime  events  were  fewer  in  number  –  and  the  proportion  of  respondents  indicating  that  this  
was  of  little  or  no  importance  was  also  greater  –  than  for  questions  about  a  process  focused  on  dis-­
cussion  of  future  relations.  The  numbers  of  respondents  who  nevertheless  indicated  that  a  reconcili-­
ation  process  focused  on  the  truth  about  the  war  is  important  or  very  important  was  still  consistently  
between  44  and  52%.
Respondents  were  asked  how  important  it  would  be  for  a  process  to  elicit  explanations  of  their  ac-­
tions  from  the  political  and  military  leaders  of  the  time  of  the  war:
A  similar  range  of  responses  were  given  when  asked  how  important   it  would  be  that   the  process  
focus  on  expert  determination  of  the  causes  of  the  war:
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5HVSRQGHQWVZHUHVOLJKWO\OHVVOLNHO\WRDI¿UPWKDWH[SHUWDJUHHPHQWRQWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VH[SHULHQFH
during  the  war  was  ‘very  important’,  but  also  slightly  less  likely  to  indicate  that  this  was  ‘very  un-­
important’:
The   same  was   true  of   respondents’   answers   to   a  question  about   the   importance  of   an  agreement  
among  experts  on  the  reasons  for  the  actions  of  military  and  political  leaders  during  the  war:
The  trend  is  not  solely  an  expression  of  support  for  future-­oriented  discussion  and  against  past-­ori-­
ented  discussion:  though  there  may  be  many  respondents  for  whom  it  would  be  better  to  ‘leave  the  
SDVWEHKLQG¶WKHUHPD\HTXDOO\EHPDQ\ZKRZRXOGIDYRXUGLVFXVVLRQRIDOORIWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVDV-­
sociated  with  the  past  in  the  context  of  a  discussion  that  will  make  a  difference  in  the  future.  There  
was  another  dimension  in  the  fact  that  the  questions  which  drew  greater  support  focused  on  dialogue  
and  discussion,  not  agreement,  explanation  or  expert  examination.  Respondents  tended  to  be  more  
strongly  in  favour  of  a  serious  national  dialogue,  involving  trustworthy  members  of  the  public  as  
ZHOODV¿JXUHVKROGLQJUHVSRQVLEOHSRVLWLRQVZKHUHDVWKHVHDUFKIRUDQDJUHHGQDUUDWLYHDERXWWKH
wartime  was  deemed  a  ‘very  important’  basis  for  trust  by  fewer  respondents.  Those  who  found  the  
IRUPHUDSSURDFKµYHU\XQLPSRUWDQW¶ZHUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\IHZHUWKDQWKRVHZKRLQGLFDWHGWKDWH[DPL-­
nation  and  agreement  on  wartime  issues  was  ‘very  unimportant’.
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ƚƌƵƐƚͲďƵŝůĚŝŶŐŝŶŝƟĂƟǀĞƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶ
EXPERT  AGREEMENT  ON  THE  POPULATION'S  EXPERIENCES  DURING  THE  WAR
20 29 29 13 9
0% 50% 100%




19 29 27 15 10
0% 50% 100%
sĞƌǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ /ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŽƚŚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂŶĚŶŽƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ EŽƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ EŽƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĂƚĂůů
   21
   3.  Attitudes  to  Reconciliation  and  Trust  Building:  the  Results  in  Greater  Detail  
Question  25:  What  are  the  next  concrete  steps  for  the  reconciliation  process?
Participants  in  the  survey  were  then  asked  to  evaluate  a  series  of  10  statements  about  concrete  steps  
that  might  or  might  not  be  important  for  the  success  of  the  reconciliation  process.  The  responses  are  
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37 20 7 4
34 22 8 7
33 20 8 6
34 28 9 5
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The  particularly  strong  support  for  activities  focused  on  increasing  understanding  and  respect  between  
citizens  deserves  attention.  If  respondents  were  not  convinced  that  this  was  an  important  priority,  it  
would  have  been  just  as  easy  to  give  non-­committal  responses  rather  than  the  high  level  of  responses  
that  these  are  ‘very  important’.  Support  for  veteran-­victim  discussions  was  almost  as  strong.  These  
FRXOGEHVHHQDVUHODWLYHO\LQWDQJLEOHDFWLYLWLHVHLWKHUGLI¿FXOWWRVHHWKHFRQFUHWHYDOXHRIRUHDV\WR
tick  on  a  form  without  thinking.  The  high  rating  they  received  came  despite  the  fact  that  they  could  
easily  be  associated  with  the  negative  attitude  to  a  focus  on  the  past  seen  elsewhere  in  the  two  surveys.
A  majority  of  those  who  responded  to  this  series  of  questions  indicated  that  it  would  be  either  important  
or  very  important  to  arrive  at  agreement  on  the  historical  facts  of  the  genocidal  programme.  This  was  in  
spite  of  the  public  controversy  associated  with  the  topic,  and  with  the  fact  that  this  is  clearly  focused  on  
political  differences  centred  on  the  past.  A  slightly  larger  majority  indicated  that  it  would  be  important  
to  agree  on  the  historical  facts  concerning  the  degree  to  which  all  peoples  suffered  during  the  war.  In  




vided  by  the  lower  support  for  special  treatment  and  protection  for  local  minorities  given  in  respons-­
HVWRWKH¿UVWRIWKLVVHULHVRITXHVWLRQV)RUWKDWRSWLRQVOLJKWO\PRUHUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHQRQFRP-­
mittal  or  viewed  this  as  an  unimportant  step,  and  fewer  indicated  that  this  would  be  very  important.
By  contrast,  local  authority  support  for  memorial  activities  in  the  cities  in  which  respondents  lived  
was  given  more  important  credit.  Not  a  bread-­and-­butter  issue  for  most  people,  this  is  nevertheless  a  
live  issue  in  cities  across  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.
Question  26:  Should  public  money  be  spent  on  reconciliation  activities,  and  which  activities?
Support  for   less   tangible,  forward-­facing  dialogue  was  also  strongest  when  asked  whether  public  
money  should  be  spent  on  activities  fostering  understanding  and  reconciliation,  on  recognition  and  
compensation  for  local  wartime  victims,  and  on  supporting  victims  and  returnees  in  their  city.  Sup-­
port   for  projects  building  understanding  was  greater   than   support   for   expert   examinations  of   the  
causes  and  experience  of  the  war,  or  for  the  creation  of  memorials  at  sites  of  war  crimes.
52%  of  respondents  supported  public  expenditure  on  memorials  and  public  information  centres  at  
sites  of  wartime  crimes,  41%  did  not.
65%  supported  expenditure  on  educational  programmes  to  take  young  people  to  memorial  sites  so  
that  they  could  learn  about  the  past  and  about  the  lessons  that  can  be  learnt  for  today.  28.2%  did  not.
84.4%  supported  expenditure  on  educational  programmes  designed  to  help  young  people  to  get  rid  
of  negative  stereotypes  and  to  understand  the  common  interests  of  citizens  of  different  backgrounds.  
10.3%  did  not.
72.5%  supported  expenditure  on  community-­led  initiatives  designed  to  make  clear  to  the  public  a  
basis  for  trust  and  cooperation.  20%  did  not.
71.4%  supported  increasing  support  for  victims  of  serious  crimes  in  the  1990s.  20.3%  did  not.
80.8%  supported  expenditure  on  social  and  cultural  programmes  focused  on  problems  relating  to  
coexistence  in  the  country,  or  to  a  common  national  life.  13.2%  did  not.
   23
   3.  Attitudes  to  Reconciliation  and  Trust  Building:  the  Results  in  Greater  Detail  
Question  27:  Who  are  the  most  important  types  of  participant  in  a  reconciliation  process?
7KHUDQJHRIUHVSRQVHVFRQ¿UPHGDSDWWHUQIURPWKHSLORWVXUYH\RIPXFKKLJKHUQXPEHUVRI
UHVSRQGHQWVDWWULEXWHGLPSRUWDQFHWRWHDFKHUVDQGWR¿JXUHVZKRUHSUHVHQWDOODQGQRWDQ\RQHVLQJOH
national  group,  while  the  role  of  politicians  was  more  divisive.
Asked  how  important  the  involvement  of  politicians  in  activities  designed  to  promote  trust  and  un-­
derstanding  was,  responses  were  spread  across  the  spectrum:
Slightly  greater  faith  was  indicated  in  the  role  of  religious  leaders:
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The  importance  of  groups  representing  victims  and  the  vulnerable  also  appeared  to  be  given  greater  
credit  than  politicians:
Teachers  received  a  still  stronger  rating,  as  they  had  in  the  pilot  survey  of  2012:
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   3.  Attitudes  to  Reconciliation  and  Trust  Building:  the  Results  in  Greater  Detail  
By  far  the  most  valued  interlocutor  in  a  trust  building  exercise:  an  individual  who  would  support  
the  interests  of  all  the  citizens  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  not  only  the  interests  of  one  of  the  
constituent  peoples:
7KLVFRQ¿UPHGWKHVWURQJSXEOLFVXSSRUWDOVRVHHQLQWKHSLORWVXUYH\IRUWKLVFDWHJRU\RIGLV-­
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4.  Religion
In  this  study,  especial  attention  was  given  to  the  question:  is  there  a  relationship  between  the  relig-­
iosity  or  non-­religiosity  of  respondents  and  their  attitudes  to  factors  and  priorities  in  the  processes  
of   reconciliation  and   trust-­building?  Our  preliminary   study   (Wilkes   et   al.,   2012)  had   shown   that  
religious  people  showed  higher  commitment   to   the   reconciliation  process   than   less   religious  and  
non-­religious  respondents,  so  we  aimed  this  time  to  test  this  previous  result  further:
We  included  more  questions  related  to  religion  than  previously.  We  asked:







Ɣ whether  they  believed  in  God,  a  life  force  or  nothing  of  the  kind.
,WZDVSRVVLEOHWRDQVZHUWRWKH¿QDOWKUHHTXHVWLRQVLQIRXURU¿YH³VWUHQJWKOHYHOV´RUQRWWRDQVZHU
at  all.
We  compared  different   indicators  of   religiosity  with   the  attitudes  of   respondents   to  several   types  
of   questions   about   reconciliation   and   trust-­building,   including   practical   questions   relating   to   the  
importance  of  different  concrete  reconciliation  initiatives  which  might  be  important  and  relating  to  
whether  or  not  public  money  should  be  spent  for  those  purposes.
Respondents  to  whom  religion  is  more  important  attributed  greater  importance  to  topics  focused  on  
the  past  in  the  trust-­building  process.  There  were  no  strong  differences  on  this  issue  dividing  Mus-­
OLPV2UWKRGR[DQG&DWKROLFV7KLVZDVDI¿UPHGE\DQVZHUVWRDQXPEHURIGLIIHUHQWVXETXHVWLRQV
For   instance,   the   less   respondents  saw   themselves  as   religious,   the   less   they  were   likely   to   think  
that  trust-­building  initiatives  must  be  focused  on  persons  who  are  responsible  for  events  during  the  
war,  or  on  agreement  among  experts  on  wartime  experiences  and  causes  of  the  war.  The  less  reli-­
gious  they  were,  the  less  support  they  gave  to  increasing  expenditure  on  the  needs  of  victims  of  war  
crimes,  on  building  memorial  and  information  centres  at   the  sites  of  atrocities,  or  on  educational  
programmes  concerning  those  events.
By  contrast,  religious  and  non-­religious  respondents  agreed  it  is  important  for  building  trust  to  en-­
able   citizens   to   understand  different   perspectives   and   to   understand   each  other   better.  They   also  
agree  that  it  is  important  to  encourage  schoolchildren  to  discuss  about  their  common  expectations  
regarding  their  future.
In   responding   to  questions  about   the   importance   (or  otherwise)  of   involving  a  series  of  different  
actors  in  the  reconciliation  process,  religious  respondents  do  not  diverge  from  less  religious  respond-­
ents  where   teachers,  politicians  and   individuals  who  support  political   interests  of  all   citizens  are  
concerned.  However,  when  compared  with  less  religious  and  non-­religious  respondents,  religious  re-­
spondents  were  more  likely  to  deem  the  role  of  women  more  important  in  the  reconciliation  process,  
and  the  same  is  true  of  the  importance  of  involving  socially-­active  lay  believers,  representatives  of  
YLFWLPVDQGWKHYXOQHUDEOHDQGSURPLQHQWUHOLJLRXV¿JXUHV
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   4.  Religion
'LIIHUHQWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVPD\EHSRVVLEOHZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH¿QGLQJWKDWWRSLFVUHODWHGWRWKHZDUWLPH
events  and  responsibility  for  those  events  are  less  important  to  individuals  who  declared  themselves  
to  be  non-­religious.  It  is  possible  that  those  to  whom  religion  is  important  are  more  likely  to  feel  
themselves   to  be  victims   than   those   to  whom  religion   is   less   important  or  who  are  not   religious.  
$OWHUQDWLYHO\LWPD\EHWKDWDWWULEXWLQJLPSRUWDQFHWRWRSLFVUHODWHGWRWKHSDVWUHÀHFWVDVWURQJHU
motivation  amongst  religious  respondents  for  discovering  broader  aspects  about  the  truth  about  the  
SDVW)URPWKHUHVXOWVRIWKHVXUYH\LWZRXOGEHGLI¿FXOWWRVKRZWKDWRQHRIWKHVHWZRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQV
is  the  right  one,  the  other  wrong.
However,  what  seems  quite  clear  is  that  the  less  religious  or  non-­religious  respondents  were  gener-­
ally  less  optimistic  about  reconciliation  and  trust-­building  than  those  to  whom  religion  is  important  
in  life.  Answering  the  question  about  which  steps  the  reconciliation  process  should  focus  upon,  re-­
ligious  respondents  were  more  positive  about  almost  every  suggested  activity  (special  treatment  for  
the  returnees,  apologies  for  war  crimes,  constitutional  reform,  agreement  on  the  historical  facts  about  
the  genocide  and  suffering,  the  role  of  war  veterans  in  changing  public  attitudes,  etc.),  except  one  
thing:  less  religious  and  non-­religious  respondents  gave  greater  importance  to  mutual  understanding  
and  respect  based  on  the  similarities  between  citizens.  Concerning  the  importance  of  mutual  under-­
standing  and  respect   for  differences  between  citizens  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,   respondents   to  
whom  religion  is  more  important  did  not  differ  from  the  less  religious  or  non-­religious.  One  could  
infer  that  the  sharing  of  common  values  made  more  sense  to  the  less  religious  respondents,  while  
respect  for  differences  proved  a  shared  value.
The  research  indicated  that  individuals  who  were  less  active  in  their  church  or  mosque,  or  those  who  
GLGQRWDWWHQGFKXUFKRUPRVTXHDWDOOZHUHOHVVVDWLV¿HGZLWKWKHLUOLIHLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD
than  believers  who  are  regular  in  their  attendance  at  church  or  mosque.  In  the  report  of  results  which  
follows,  we  describe  as  more  religiously-­observant  those  respondents  commonly  referred  to  as  “ac-­
tive  believers”,  based  on  their  level  of  religious  practice  rather  than  on  their  beliefs  or  commitments.  
Whereas  respondents  declaring  higher  levels  of  religious  observance  were  less  likely  than  other  re-­
spondents  to  consider  that  political  changes  would  be  important  for  the  reconciliation  process,  they  
laid  more  stress  on   the  need  for   improving  social   relationships   than  other   respondents  did.  Their  
assessments  of  the  importance  of  reconciliation  and  trust-­building  activities  at  the  local  and  national  
OHYHOVZHUHQRWVLJQL¿FDQWO\GLIIHUHQWIURPWKRVHRIRWKHUUHVSRQGHQWVEXWQRQUHOLJLRXVDQGOHVV
active  believers  did  give  slightly  more  support  to  the  impact  of  a  reconciliation  process  at  the  wider  
regional  level  (including  Croatia  and  Serbia).  Actively  practicing  believers  attributed  greater  impor-­
tance  to  a  focus  on  topics  relating  to  the  past  than  those  who  are  less  religiously  active  or  who  are  
not  religiously  active  did,  just  as  was  the  case  for  respondents  who  indicated  in  response  to  another  
question  that  religion  was  important  or  very  important  to  them.
More  religiously-­observant  believers  gave  more  weight  than  other  respondents  did  to  the  importance  
of  reconciliation  and  trust-­building  initiatives  focusing  on  a  serious  encounter  between  persons  in  
today’s  political  life,  on  the  engagement  of  sincere  believers,  and  on  persons  responsible  for  events  
in  the  1990s  explaining  their  actions.  By  contrast,  respondents  who  do  not  attend  church  or  mosque  
believed  that  reconciliation  initiatives  should  be  more  focused  on  enabling  citizens  to  understand  
each  others’  perspectives  better.  Religious  observant  respondents  were  more  likely  than  others  to  in-­
dicate  that  it  would  be  important  for  the  reconciliation  process  that  minority  returnees  receive  special  
treatment  and  protection  in  their  cities,  that  political  leaders  apologize  for  crimes  committed  in  the  
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past,  that  local  communities  support  memorial  events  of  minority  groups,  that  constitutional  reform  
HQGFRQÀLFWVEHWZHHQSDUWLHVWKDWDJUHHPHQWEHPDGHDERXWWKHIDFWVUHODWLQJWRWKHZDUWLPHDQGLI
war  veterans  and  war  victims  held  joint  discussions.
Religiously  observant  respondents  were  more  likely  than  others  to  support  public  expenditure  on  
memorial  and  information  centres  at  sites  of  atrocities  (the  majority  of  respondents,  regardless  of  
WKHLUDWWLWXGHWRUHOLJLRXVDFWLYLW\ZHUHOLNHO\WREHSRVLWLYHDERXWWKLVVWHS([SHQGLWXUHRQLQFUHDV-­
ing  support  to  victims  of  serious  crimes  in  the  1990s  was  supported  more  by  religiously  observant  
respondents  (81.6%)  than  by  those  who  do  not  attend  church  or  mosque  (72.0%).  The  most  reli-­
giously  observant  respondents  were  more  likely  to  support  expenditure  on  educational  programmes  
designed  to  bring  young  people  to  memorial  sites  in  order  to  understand  the  past  and  its  lessons.  This  
difference  was  not  evident  for  the  forward  looking  options:  approximately  90%  of  both  religiously  
observant  and  other  respondent  groups  supported  spending  on  educational  programmes  designed  to  
help  young  people  to  get  rid  of  negative  stereotypes  and  to  understand  which  interests  are  shared  by  
all  citizens  regardless  of  their  background,  as  well  as  on  social  and  cultural  programmes  focused  on  
problems  of  coexistence  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.
When  it  comes  to  evaluating  the  importance  of  different  types  of  actor  in  the  process  of  reconcilia-­
tion,  the  religiously  observant  were  more  likely  than  others  to  support  including  prominent  religious  
¿JXUHVRUJDQL]DWLRQVUHSUHVHQWLQJYLFWLPVRUWKHYXOQHUDEOHDQGVRFLDOO\DFWLYHOD\EHOLHYHUV2Q
the  other  hand,  less  observant  believers  and  those  who  do  not  attend  church  or  mosque  at  all  were  
more  emphatic   than  religiously-­observant   respondents  were  about   the   roles   to  be  played  both  by  
teachers  and  by  those  who  represent  interests  of  all  citizens  and  not  only  the  interests  of  one  of  the  
constituent  peoples.
Respondent  preferences  concerning  reconciliation  and  trust-­building  processes  were  also  compared  
ZLWKDQVZHUVWRTXHVWLRQVDERXWUHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQDQGQRQDI¿OLDWLRQ$PDMRULW\RIDGKHUHQWV
RIDOOUHOLJLRXVWUDGLWLRQVLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\ZHUHQRWVDWLV¿HGZLWKOLIHLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD
PRUH0XVOLPVZHUHVDWLV¿HGZLWK WKH OLIH LQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD RI0XVOLPV WKHQ
&DWKROLFVDQGWKHOHDVWVDWLV¿HGRIWKHWKUHHJURXSVZDVWKH2UWKRGR[*UDSK
7KHSURSRUWLRQRI WKRVHXQVDWLV¿HGZLWK OLIH LQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDULVHVDERYHDPRQJ
atheists,  and  even  above  90%  amongst  agnostics.  The  majority  of  respondents,  regardless  of  their  re-­
OLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQEHOLHYHGWKDWHFRQRPLFLPSURYHPHQWZDVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUZKLFKZRXOG
contribute  to  better  quality  of  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (more  important  than  improvement  of  
social  relations  and  of  the  political  situation  in  the  country),  with  the  notable  exception  of  agnostics,  
of  whom  less  than  a  half  indicated  that  an  economic  improvement  would  be  important  for  improving  
quality  of  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Only  agnostics  saw  political  reform  of  the  country  as  the  
most  important  factor  of  improving  quality  of  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.
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*UDSKVKRZVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIUHVSRQGHQWVZKREHOLHYHWKDWDQDWWHPSWWREXLOGWUXVWDQG
reconciliation  would  have  an  impact  on  state,  local  and  regional  level  in  relation  to  their  religious  
DI¿OLDWLRQ
29% 34% 24% 25% 26%
35% 32%
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   4.  Religion
49% 52% 49%
67% 62% 57% 51%
51% 48% 51%

































































































A  large  majority  of  respondents  believed  that  a  serious  attempt  to  build  relationships  of  trust  among  
religious  and  ethnic  groups  would  have  an  impact  on  the  entire  territory  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  
although  this  majority  is  considerably  smaller  among  the  Orthodox  than  among  adherents  of  any  
other  religion  or  worldview  (including  atheists  and  agnostics).  Similarly,  respondent  groups  from  all  
religious  and  non-­religious  backgrounds  believed  that  a  serious  attempt  to  build  trust  would  have  an  
impact  in  the  territory  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  (Croatia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Serbia),  although  
Muslims  and  Catholics  were  slightly  less  positive  about  this  than  others,  and  agnostics  and  atheists  
were  remarkably  positive.  However,  answering  the  essential  question  on  the  potential  impact  of  a  
reconciliation  and  trust-­building  process  in  their  local  community  (city  and  surrounding  region),  all  
respondents,  and  most  markedly  the  members  of  the  three  largest  religious  communities,  indicated  
VLJQL¿FDQWO\OHVVEHOLHILQWKLVWKDQZKHQDQVZHULQJWKHVDPHTXHVWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRWKHWHUULWRU\RI
WKHIRUPHU<XJRVODYLD7KHUHVHDUFKVKRZHGWKDWFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKHSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWRIWKHUHFRQFLOLD-­
tion  process  at  each  of  the  three  levels  (local,  country,  regional)  was  almost  identical  among  Muslims  
and  Catholics,  Orthodox  had  more  faith  in  the  relevance  of  this  process  at  local  and  regional  levels,  
DQGVLJQL¿FDQWO\OHVVDWWKHOHYHORI%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDDQGDJQRVWLFVDWKHLVWVDQGRWKHUVLQGL-­
FDWHGFRQVLVWHQWO\KLJKFRQ¿GHQFHLQWKLVSURFHVV
To  the  question  whether  such  initiatives  should  be  focused  on  relationships  between  the  constituent  
peoples,   the  majority  answered  positively,   though  this  majority  is  slightly  below  the  total  sample  
average  among  agnostics  and  Orthodox  respondents.  Such  a  level  of  agreement  between  adherents  
of  all   faiths  and  worldviews  counters   the  perception  commonly  presented   in  public   that   this   is  a  
‘forced’  perspective:  observing  the  problem  through  the  prism  of  relationships  between  the  constitu-­
HQWSHRSOHVLVQRWH[FOXVLYHO\FRQQHFWHGZLWKUHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQLHFKRLFHRIIDLWKDQGZRUOGYLHZ
91% 87% 93% 85% 92% 89% 83%









































   4.  Religion
Answering  the  question  what  place  topics  addressing  the  past  demand  in  the  trust-­building  process,  






There  is  an  interesting  difference  between  followers  of  different  confessions  and  worldviews  in  an-­
swering  the  question  “What  should  an  initiative  of  building  a  relationship  of  trust  be  focused  on?”  
The  greatest  importance  was  given  to  serious  encounters  between  politicians  and  to  contribution  of  
sincere  believers  by  Catholics  and  the  least  by  agnostics.  Muslims  indicated  as  important  for  this  
process  that  persons  responsible  for  events  in  the  90s  of  the  20th  century  have  to  give  an  explanation  
for  their  activities,  which  was  relatively  important  to  Catholic  respondents,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  to  
agnostic,  Orthodox  and  atheist  respondents.  On  the  other  hand,  atheists,  agnostics  and  “others”  (re-­
ligious  minorities  including  Protestants)  indicated  the  greatest  support  for  a  trust-­building  initiative  
focused  on  encouraging  school  children  to  speak  about  expectations  for  the  future,  and  atheists  and  
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derstand  different  views  on  this  subject,  to  understand  each  other  better,  and  on  the  contribution  of  
people  who  can  understand  different  perspectives.  Atheists  attributed  more  importance  than  others  to  
serious  engagement  of  politicians  with  people  they  represent.  This  may  be  indicative  of  the  extent  to  
which  atheists  are  aware  of  their  minority  position  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  that  topics  related  
to  that  have  priorities  for  them.  Among  Orthodox  respondents,  it  was  not  possible  to  observe  any  
decisive  trend  in  relation  to  attributing  great  importance  to  any  of  the  suggested  answers  to  what  the  
trust-­building  initiative  should  be  focused  on,  but  it  is  possible  to  detect  lesser  attribution  of  impor-­
tance  to  expert  agreement  on  experiences  of  the  population  and  causes  for  actions  of  military  and  
political  leaders  during  the  war  than  it  was  the  case  across  other  confessions.
In  response  to  questions  about  which  steps  would  be  important  to  take  for  the  process  of  reconciliation  
(Q25),  Muslim  respondents  were  more  likely  than  Catholic  and  Orthodox  respondents  to  indicate  that  the  
SURFHVVZRXOGUHFHLYHDVLJQL¿FDQWFRQWULEXWLRQLIPLQRULW\UHWXUQHHVZHUHJLYHQVSHFLDOWUHDWPHQWDQG
SURWHFWLRQ7KHUHZHUHE\FRQWUDVWQRVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQWKHUHVSRQVHVRIJURXSVDI¿OLDWHG
with  the  three  religious  traditions  with  respect  to  the  other  steps  towards  greater  reconciliation  listed.
Responses  about  priorities   in  spending  budget  money  (Q26)  indicated  that  Orthodox  respondents  
were   less   likely   than   the  average  across  all   respondents   to  support  expenditure   for  every   type  of  
activity  listed.  Muslims  were  more  likely  than  the  average,  and  Catholics  were  near  the  average.  A  
fuller  picture  gives  more  nuance  to  these  general  patterns.
For  instance,  a  large  majority  of  Muslims  was  positive  about  spending  public  money  on  setting  me-­
PRULDODQGLQIRUPDWLRQFHQWUHVDWVLWHVRIDWURFLRXVFULPHVDVOLJKWPDMRULW\RI&DWKROLFVVXSSRUWHG
WKLVDPDMRULW\RI2UWKRGR[DQGDJQRVWLFUHVSRQGHQWVGLGQRWVXSSRUWLWDPRQJDWKHLVWVDQG³RWKHUV´
a  half  favoured  it  and  a  half  were  against  it.  Similarly,  Muslims  were  most  likely  to  support  increas-­
LQJ¿QDQFLDOVXSSRUWWRYLFWLPVRIVHULRXVZDUFULPHVLQWKHVDQGDOEHLWWRDOHVVHUH[WHQWWKLV
was  also  supported  by  members  of  other  confessions,  including  the  Orthodox.  A  huge  majority  of  
0XVOLPVDQGDVLJQL¿FDQWPDMRULW\RI&DWKROLFVDQGUHVSRQGHQWVZKRLGHQWL¿HGDV³2WKHU´IDYRXUHG
spending  public  money  on  educational  programmes  to  bring  young  people  from  across  the  country  
to  memorial  sites  so  as  to  enable  them  to  understand  the  past  and  learn  the  lessons  from  it.  A  slight  
PDMRULW\RIDJQRVWLFVDQGDWKHLVWVDOVRDI¿UPHGWKLVDQGDKDOIRIWKH2UWKRGR[UHVSRQGHQWVDJUHHG
while  a  half  did  not.  The  Orthodox  part  of  the  sample  were  more  positive  about  spending  money  
on  social  and  cultural  programmes  focused  on  problems  of  coexistence  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  
over  and  above  the  general  consensus  behind  this  type  of  activity.
Almost  a  quarter  of  the  sample  (including  members  of  all  religions  and  worldviews)  saw  themselves  
as  a  religious  minority  in  the  place  where  they  live.  Concerning  the  perspective  of  a  religious  mi-­
nority  in  a  certain  territory,  it  appears  from  the  survey  data  that  those  who  perceive  themselves  to  
be  part  of  a  religious  minority  feel  more  strongly  about  the  need  for  the  engagement  of  politicians  
in  reconciliation  work,  about  the  need  for  school  children  to  meet  and  to  identify  the  expectations  
that  they  share  regarding  their  future,  about  the  engagement  of  sincere  believers  and  about  the  role  
to  be  played  by  those  members  of  different  communities  who  are  capable  of  understanding  different  
attitudes  and  views.  Faced  with  options  for  reconciliation  activities  that  would  be  important  to  take  
QRZ4WKRVHZKRLGHQWL¿HGWKHPVHOYHVDVSDUWRIDPLQRULW\JDYHPXFKPRUHVXSSRUWWRDOORI
the  listed  activities  than  those  who  did  not  identify  with  a  minority  religiously.
Asked  about  the  role  to  be  played  by  different  actors  (Q27),  those  who  identify  themselves  as  mem-­
bers  of  a  minority  in  religious  terms  indicated  greater  support  than  other  respondents  did  to  including  
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SURPLQHQWUHOLJLRXV¿JXUHVWHDFKHUVUHOLJLRXVOD\SHUVRQVDQGLQGLYLGXDOVZKRVXSSRUWWKHSROLWLFDO
interests   of   all   citizens   rather   than   the   interests   of   one   constituent   people.  There  were  no  differ-­
ences  in  the  two  groups’  responses  to  the  role  to  be  played  by  politicians,  women  and  groups  that  
represent  victims’  interests.  Since  many  in  minority  positions  have  experienced  being  unprotected  
and  wounded  as  a  group  –  and  many  of  these  wounds  are  still  unhealed  –  it  was  to  be  expected  that  




they  are  majority.  Given  this,  it  is  noteable  that  both  minorities  and  majority  agreed,  almost  to  the  
same  proportion,  that  the  primary  focus  for  improving  the  situation  in  the  country  should  be  to  solve  
economic  problems,  and  both  ranked  political  reform  lower  and  social  relations  lower  still.  In  that  
light,  it  is  striking,  and  indicative  of  the  difference  between  minority  and  majority  experiences  and  
perspectives,   that   a  greater  proportion  of  members  of   religious  minorities   (92.6%)   indicated   that  
reconciliation  processes  should  focus  on  a  relationship  between  the  constituent  peoples  (for  other  
UHVSRQGHQWVWKH¿JXUHZDV
Within  local  religious  or  non-­religious  groups  in  the  sample,  the  majority-­minority  proportion  across  
WKHUHVSRQGHQWVZDVDVIROORZV)RU0XVOLPVLGHQWL¿HGZLWKWKHPDMRULW\PLQRULW\
and  6.4%  of  Muslims  did  not  answer  this  question.  Similarly,  of  the  Orthodox  respondents,  77.7%  
LGHQWL¿HGZLWKWKHPDMRULW\DVDPLQRULW\DQGGLGQRWDQVZHU$PRQJ&DWKROLFVWKH
VLWXDWLRQLVGLIIHUHQW±WKHJURXSZKLFKLGHQWL¿HVDVSDUWRIDPLQRULW\LVODUJHUZLWKWKHPD-­
jority,  20.9%  as  a  minority,  and  as  many  as  8.4%  did  not  want  to  answer.  55.1%  of  agnostics  and  
RIDWKHLVWVLGHQWL¿HGDVDPLQRULW\
Table  1.  shows   the  proportion  (%)  of   respondents  who  declared   that   they  belong   to   the  religious  
majority  or  to  a  minority  who  support  spending  public  money  on  a  series  of  activities  aimed  at  rec-­
onciliation  and  trust-­building.
Do  you  support  public  revenue  being  spent  on: Members  of  reli-­
gous  minorities
DQVZHUHG³<(6´
Members  of  the  
religious  majority
DQVZHUHG³<(6´
A  memorial  and  public  information  centre  at  places  where  
grave  crimes  were  committed  
56.5  % 56.0  %
(GXFDWLRQDOSURJUDPPHVZKLFKEULQJWKH\RXQJWRJHWKHU
across  the  country  to  memorial  sites  in  order  to  understand  
the  past  and  the  lessons  it  teaches  
73.5  % 68.7  %
(GXFDWLRQDOSURJUDPPHVZKLFKKHOSWKH\RXQJWRDGGUHVV
negative  stereotypes  and  to  understand  the  common  inter-­
ests  of  citizens  from  different  backgrounds
93.1  % 87.6  %
Community-­led  initiatives  indicating  the  bases  of  trust  and  
public  cooperation
81.4  % 77.1  %
Increased  support  for  victims  of  serious  crimes  in  the  1990s   78.5  % 78.6  %
Social  and  cultural  programmes  which  focus  on  problems  
of  living  together  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina
89.7  % 84.6  %
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The  research  showed  that  respondents  whose  immediate  family  members  belong  to  the  same  reli-­
gious  tradition  were  more  likely  to  indicate  that  topics  addressing  the  past  were  more  important  than  
was  the  case  for  respondents  whose  family  members  do  not  belong  to  the  same  religious  tradition.  
Similarly,  respondents  whose  immediate  family  members  belong  to  the  same  religious  tradition  were  
more  likely  to  indicate  that  creating  memorial  and  information  centres  designed  to  inform  the  public  
about  the  past  would  contribute  to  reconciliation.  These  respondents  were  more  likely  to  attribute  
importance  to  expert  agreement  on  historical  facts  about  experiences  and  causes  of  the  war  and  to  a  
public  accounting  by  individuals  responsible  for  actions  during  the  war.  They  were  also  more  likely  
to  support  spending  public  money  on  increasing  support  for  victims  of  war  crimes.
On  the  other  hand,  respondents  whose  immediate  family  members  do  not  belong  to  the  same  tradi-­
tion  were  more  likely  to  think  that  a  trust-­building  initiative  would  be  strengthened  by  the  contri-­
butions  of  people  who  can  understand  the  different  perspectives  of  members  of  other  communities.  
However,  there  were  no  differences  between  the  two  groups  in  relation  to  supporting  educational  
programmes  and  to  encouraging  school  children  to  talk  about  expectations  they  share  regarding  their  
future.  Both  groups  support  this  in  a  large  proportion.
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When   this   study  was  designed,   participants   in   public   and   specialist   discussions  wanted   to   know  
whether  there  would  be  lower  levels  of  support  for  reconciliation  activities  in  some  cities  than  in  
others:
Ɣ lower   in   the   most   economically   deprived   locations   (such   as   Livno,   Srebrenica,   Stolac   or  
7HVOLüDQGKLJKHULQPRUHSURVSHURXVORFDWLRQVHJ%DQMD/XND6DUDMHYR
Ɣ ORZHULQVPDOOHURUPHGLXPVL]HGFLWLHVVXFKDV%LKDü/LYQR6UHEUHQLFD7HVOLüDQG7UHELQ-­
je)  and  higher  in  large  cities  (notably  Banja  Luka,  Bijeljina,  Mostar  and  Tuzla)
Ɣ lower  in  cities  which  had  experienced  the  harshest  forms  of  wartime  persecution,  particularly  
where   this   involved   ethnic   cleansing   (Srebrenica,  Bijeljina,  Trebinje),   and   higher   in   cities  
which  had  been  comparatively   fortunate  or  which   saw  a   relatively   low   level  of   attacks  on  
civilians  and  civilian  areas  during  the  war  (Livno)
Ɣ lower  in  towns  which  had  always  been  overwhelmingly  inhabited  by  citizens  of  only  one  of  
the  constituent  peoples  (Livno)  and  higher  in  mixed  cities  (Mostar,  Banja  Luka,  Sarajevo,  or  
Tuzla)
Ɣ DQG¿QDOO\ ORZHU LQFLWLHVRQ WKHFRXQWU\¶VSHULSKHU\ 6UHEUHQLFD/LYQR%LMHOMLQD%UþNR
7HVOLüDQG7UHELQMHDQGKLJKHULQWKHFHQWUDODUHDVRIWKHFRXQWU\ZKLFKDVFRPPRQO\GH¿QHG
includes  Sarajevo,  Mostar,  Banja  Luka,  Jajce,  Stolac  and  Tuzla).
Given   these  speculative  expectations,  what  proves  more  striking   in  our   results   than   the  diversity  
across  the  13  cities  covered  is  the  strength  of  the  public  support  for  reconciliation  activities  in  all  
cities.  Local  conditions  and  local  cultures  can  be  detected  in  quite  different  patterns  in  each  city  in  
which  the  poll  was  conducted.  Nevertheless,  there  was  no  single  deeper  factor  making  opinion  opti-­
mistic  or  positive  in  one  set  of  cities  while  opinion  in  others  was  radically  opposed  or  so  dramatically  
different  as  to  make  it  clear  that  historic  events,  economics  or  politics  is  the  primary  factor  shaping  
local  opinion.  Figures  will  be  given  here   for   responses   to  Q21,  and  distinctive   features   from   the  
VXEVHTXHQWTXHVWLRQVDUHDOVRUHSRUWHGDOEHLWZLWKRXWSUHFLVH¿JXUHV±PRUHGHWDLOHGUHVXOWVDUHWREH
published  covering  these  questions  in  more  in-­depth  publications  in  2014/2015.
Across  these  cities  a  steadily  high  degree  of  support  was  shown  for  reconciliation  as  an  embracing  
social  process.  Support  for  a  country-­wide  reconciliation  process  does  not  drop  in  any  city  below  
64%  (Q21).  It  rises  in  Sarajevo  and  Banja  Luka  to  84%  and  82%.  In  all  cities,  concrete  steps  backed  
where  necessary  by  public  funding  were  viewed  as  important.  In  all  cities,  a  majority  of  respond-­
HQWVDI¿UPHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUHDFKLQJDJUHHPHQWRQWKHKLVWRULFDOIDFWVDERXWWKHJHQRFLGDOSUR-­
JUDPPHRIWKHVDQGDOVRDI¿UPHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIDJUHHLQJRQWKHIDFWVDERXWWKHH[WHQWWR
which  people  from  all  backgrounds  suffered  at  the  time.
By  contrast,  the  proportion  of  respondents  who  were  consistently  very  negative  about  the  importance  
of  reconciliation  initiatives  was  very  small  in  all  cities,  a  fairly  steady  5%.  It  was  approximately  the  
same  as  the  proportion  of  respondents  (7%)  who  asserted  that  their  sense  of  national  identity  was  
important  in  their  decisions  about  whom  they  are  friends  with.  A  further  5%  fairly  consistently  indi-­
cated  that  reconciliation  initiatives  were  not  likely  to  be  important,  rather  than  indicating  that  they  
were  very  unimportant.
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There  are  some  interesting  variations,  making  clear  that  a  proportion  of  the  respondents  in  different  
cities  either  tended  to  favour  different  approaches  to  reconciliation  or  expected  that  these  different  
approaches  were  more  likely  to  promote  reconciliation.  It  would  not  be  easy  to  claim  that  variations  
in  the  responses  of  citizens  in  the  13  locations  are  due  to  any  one  factor.  Indeed,  the  number  of  fac-­
WRUVWKDWPLJKWEHDWSOD\PDNHLWGLI¿FXOWWRJLYHFOHDULQGLFDWRUVRIWKHLQÀXHQFHRIWKHZDURIHFR-­
nomics,  of  the  size  of  a  city,  or  of  the  differences  between  the  centre  and  the  periphery.  The  sample  
for  locations  at  the  centre  of  the  country  is  dominated  by  the  three  largest  cities,  Sarajevo,  Mostar  
and  Banja  Luka,  which  are  also  three  of  the  more  prosperous  cities  in  the  sample  and  the  most  obvi-­
ous  examples  of  locations  with  ‘mixed’  (as  against  mononational)  populations.  The  peripheral  cities  
included  here  include  a  higher  proportion  of  cities  which  are  smaller,  less  prosperous  and  largely  
monoethnic.
That  there  is  a  difference  between  the  range  of  responses  in  central  and  in  peripheral  cities  is  not  
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%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDZHUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\PRUH OLNHO\ WKDQ WKHVDPSOH IURPSHULSKHUDOFLWLHV WR
DI¿UPWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUHFRQFLOLDWLRQLQLWLDWLYHVZKHWKHUWKH\HQFRPSDVVHGWKHFLW\DQGLWVUHJLRQ
or  the  whole  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  or  also  Serbia  and  Croatia  (Q21).  The  central  sample  was  
PRUH OLNHO\ WR DI¿UP WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI DQ\ UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ SURFHVV IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSV
EHWZHHQWKHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHV4PRUHOLNHO\WRDI¿UPWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIDOPRVWDOOFRQFUHWH
forms  of   reconciliation   initiative  described   in   the   survey   as   possible   ‘next   steps’   (Q25)  with   the  
exception  of  activities  aimed  at  promoting  the  appreciation  of  diversity,  and  more  likely  to  indicate  
that  a  range  of  actors  should  be  seen  as  important  contributors  to  a  process  of  reconciliation  (particu-­
larly  noticeable  for  assessments  of  the  role  to  be  played  by  women,  representatives  of  victims  and  
YXOQHUDEOHJURXSVWHDFKHUVDQG¿JXUHVQRWLGHQWL¿HGZLWKDQ\RQHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOH47KH
difference  between  the  range  of  responses  given  in  central  and  peripheral  cities  was  largely  a  result  
of   there  being  a  higher  proportion  of  central   respondents  who  gave   the  response  ‘Important’  and  
‘Very  Important’,  rather  than  a  more  non-­committal  ‘It  is  and  it  is  not  [Important]’.  In  both  central  
and  peripheral  locations,  the  proportions  of  negative  or  very  negative  respondents  were  small.  But  
WKHSHULSKHUDOFLWLHVDOVRWHQGHGWRHQFRPSDVVDVLJQL¿FDQWO\JUHDWHUSURSRUWLRQRISRVLWLYHUHVSRQVHV
to  a  different  kind  of  question:  expert  judgements  about  the  wartime  (Q24)  and  the  record  of  past  
governments  (Q23/4).  Asked  about  the  importance  of  various  dialogue-­based  reconciliation  activi-­
WLHV4UHVSRQGHQWVIURPFHQWUDOFLWLHVWHQGHGWREHPRUHSRVLWLYHDVNHGDERXWLQYHVWLJDWLRQRI
the  causes  of  the  war,  the  nature  of  decisions  made  in  the  war,  and  the  nature  of  the  population’s  ex-­
perience  during  the  war,  the  peripheral  population  included  a  greater  proportion  of  respondents  who  
indicated  that  this  is  important.  A  similar  divergence  can  be  observed  distinguishing  the  responses  of  
employed  and  unemployed  participants  in  the  survey  (discussed  further  below).
In  contrast  to  the  temptation  to  rely  on  these  contextual  factors  to  explain  positive  responses  in  Sa-­
UDMHYRDQG%DQMD/XNDRUQHJDWLYHUHVSRQVHVLQ%LMHOMLQDWKHUHDUHDOVRVSHFL¿FDOO\ORFDOFRQWH[WXDO
factors  which  may  be  used  to  explain  what  is  distinctive  about  responses  from  each  city.  What  fol-­
lows  indicates  that  the  data  presents  a  more  complex  picture  of  opinion  in  each  city  than  generalizing  
explanations  would  allow.
$OWKRXJKLQDOOFLWLHVDFOHDUPDMRULW\RIUHVSRQGHQWVDI¿UPHGWKDWDFRXQWU\ZLGHUHFRQFLOLDWLRQSUR-­
cess  was  likely  to  be  important,  in  Banja  Luka  and  in  Sarajevo  the  level  of  support  was  well  above  
WKHDYHUDJHIRUWKHZKROHVDPSOHDWRYHU$I¿UPDWLRQVRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDWD
local  level  and  at  the  regional  level,  including  Croatia  and  Serbia,  were  less  dominant  in  almost  all  
FLWLHV,QPRVWFLWLHVOHVVWKDQKDOIWKHVDPSOHDI¿UPHGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIDUHFRQFLOLDWLRQSURFHVV
focused  on  the  city  and  its  immediate  region.  In  three  cities,  however,  a  majority  favoured  such  a  
process:  in  Mostar  (56%),  in  Stolac  (65%),  and  in  Sarajevo  (84%).  Whereas  in  most  cities  the  pro-­
portion  of  respondents  who  indicated  that  reconciliation  on  the  larger  regional  level,  with  Croatia  
and  Serbia,  would  have  an  impact  was  between  50  and  63%,  in  Mostar  it  was  69%,  in  Trebinje  70%,  
in  Tuzla  71%  and  in  Sarajevo  81%.




the  range  of  possible  responses  more,  still  with  considerably  more  positive  than  negative  responses,  
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but  also  with  large  numbers  giving  a  non-­committal  answer  (instead  of  indicating  ‘it  is  important’  or  
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Among  questions  about   the   steps  necessary   for  a   reconciliation  process   (Q25)  were   some  which  
might  be  expected  to  divide  the  population:  questions  about  memorials  and  ensuring  public  recogni-­
tion  of  the  genocide  of  the  1990s.  The  city  responses  in  fact  generally  diverge  remarkably  little  from  
the  average  for  the  whole  sample,  with  Bijeljina  offering  a  more  negative  set  of  responses  and  Banja  




memorials   receiving   less   importance   than   the  country-­wide  average,  but  a   focus  on   the  common  
interests  of  citizens  being  more  solidly  supported  than  across  the  country  as  a  whole.
In  response  to  questions  about  the  importance  of  spending  public  money  on  various  reconciliation  
activities  (Q26),  the  range  of  responses  in  most  cities  was  mostly  near  to  the  average  for  the  whole  
sample.  There  were  no  great  divergences  from  the  overall  sample  in  the  range  of  responses  given  by  
UHVSRQGHQWVLQ%UþNR0RVWDURU6DUDMHYR4XHVWLRQVDERXWPHPRULDOVIRUORFDOVIURPWKHVPDOOHVW
and  least  favoured  of  the  constituent  peoples  proved  more  divisive:  viewed  as  a  less  important  focus  
LQ%DQMD/XND%LMHOMLQDDQG7UHELQMHWKDQHOVHZKHUHWKH\ZHUHHPSKDWLFDOO\VXSSRUWHGLQ%LKDü
Jajce,  Srebrenica,  and  Tuzla.  Opinion  in  Banja  Luka  was  noticeably  more  in  favour  of  some  forms  
of  expenditure  on  reconciliation  activity   than   the  country-­wide  average.  Although   in  Banja  Luka  
spending  on  memorials  and  information  centres  at  sites  of  atrocity  was  not  deemed  at  all  important,  
the  expense  of  sending  groups  of  children  to  learn  about  these  sites  was  seen  as  very  important  –  as  
were  programmes  building  mutual  understanding  amongst  citizens,  community  trust-­building  initia-­
tives  and  victim  support.  Srebrenica,  too,  saw  a  markedly  greater  importance  than  across  the  country  
as  a  whole  given  to  community  trust-­building  initiatives  and  the  promotion  of  a  common  social  and  
FXOWXUDO OLIH ,Q%LKDü-DMFH7UHELQMHDQG7X]ODJUHDWHU LPSRUWDQFHZDV LQGLFDWHG WKDQZDV WUXH
across  the  country  for  programmes  taking  children  to  atrocity  sites.
Local  conditions  appear  to  have  played  a  part  in  distinguishing  the  range  of  responses  to  Question  
27  about  the  importance  of  different  types  of  actor  in  a  reconciliation  process,  at  least  for  some  cit-­
ies.  This  was  not  true  for  all  cities,  in  a  number  of  which  the  range  of  responses  witnessed  varied  
little  from  the  average  across  the  country.  Thus,  in  Livno,  Sarajevo,  Srebrenica,  Stolac  and  Tuzla,  
responses  were  around  or  above  the  country-­wide  average  for  most  or  all  questions  (though  in  Sara-­
jevo,  political  and  religious  leaders  were  given  greater  credit  than  across  the  country  as  a  whole).  In  
%LMHOMLQDDQG%UþNRWKHUDQJHRIUHVSRQVHVZDVVOLJKWO\OHVVSRVLWLYHWKDQWKHFRXQWU\ZLGHDYHUDJH
In  other  cities,  there  were  much  more  distinctive  variations  away  from  the  country-­wide  average.  
There  is  no  clear  pattern  of  factors  which  explains  this  diversity  across  all  cities,  though  a  combi-­
nation  of  local  conditions  may  become  apparent  after  further  research  planned  in  the  coming  year:
,Q7HVOLüSROLWLFLDQVDQGUHOLJLRXVOHDGHUVZHUHYLHZHGPRUHQHJDWLYHO\VLQFHUHUHOLJLRXVEHOLHYHUV
received  more   emphatically   negative   responses,   indicating   that   their   potential   role  was   very   un-­
important,  and  the  representatives  of  victims  received  less  positive  responses  than  was  true  across  
WKHFRXQWU\+RZHYHU7HVOLüUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHYHU\SRVLWLYHDERXWWKHUROHVWREHSOD\HGE\ERWK
WHDFKHUVDQG¿JXUHVQRW LGHQWL¿HGZLWKDQ\RQHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOH DEOH WRXQGHUVWDQGGLYHUJHQW
perspectives.
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   5.  The  Thirteen  Cities
,Q7X]ODDQH[FHSWLRQDOO\SRVLWLYHUHVSRQVHZDVJLYHQWR¿JXUHVQRWLGHQWL¿HGZLWKDQ\RQHFRQVWLW-­
uent  people,  while  otherwise  the  range  of  responses  given  in  the  city  tended  to  approximate  to  the  
average  for  the  sample  across  the  country  –  a  little  more  split  over  politicians,  more  non-­committal  
about  religious  leaders,  and  slightly  more  negative  about  the  notion  of  socially-­active  lay  religious  
¿JXUHVIDFLOLWDWLQJSURJUHVVLQUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDFWLYLWLHV
Trebinje  respondents  were  far  more  positive  about  the  role  to  be  played  by  politicians  than  might  be  
expected,  were  more  clearly  split  over  religious  leaders  than  was  true  across  the  country,  and  were  
PRUHOXNHZDUPRUQHJDWLYHDERXWWKHUROHWREHSOD\HGE\ZRPHQWHDFKHUVDQGOD\UHOLJLRXV¿JXUHV
In  Mostar,  a  greater  proportion  of  respondents  than  across  the  country  gave  non-­committal  assess-­
ments  of  the  roles  to  be  played  by  women,  teachers,  religious  leaders,  and  representatives  of  victims  
and  the  vulnerable.  The  potential   role  of  politicians  received  a  more  negative  response  here   than  
DFURVVWKHFRXQWU\ZKLOHWKHUROHWREHSOD\HGE\VRFLDOO\DFWLYHOD\¿JXUHVZDVYLHZHGKHUHPRUH
positively  than  across  the  whole  sample.
%LKDüVDZVOLJKWO\PRUHSRVLWLYHUHVSRQVHVWRPRVWRIWKHVHW\SHVRIUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDJHQWWKDQZDV
seen  country-­wide,  with  the  clear  exception  of  lay  religious  actors,  who  were  valued  less  positively  
as  a  category  than  across  the  country.
While  the  roles  of  victims’  groups  and  of  women  received  more  very  positive  responses  in  Jajce  than  
across  the  country,  politicians  were  less  highly  valued  here  than  elsewhere,  and  respondents  here  
JDYHPRUHSRODUL]HGUHVSRQVHVWRUHOLJLRXVOHDGHUVDQGDFWLYHUHOLJLRXVOD\¿JXUHV




gave  more  lukewarm  assessments  of  the  roles  to  be  played  by  politicians,  religious  leaders  and  rep-­
resentatives  of  victims  and  vulnerable  groups,  they  also  included  a  lower  proportion  of  respondents  
giving  negative  or  very  negative  responses  than  was  the  case  across  the  country.
The  data  from  responses  to  all  of  these  questions  makes  clear  that  the  largest,  mixed  cities  in  the  
country’s  central  regions  –  Sarajevo,  Mostar  and  Banja  Luka  –  were  not  always  more  positive  than  
VPDOOHUODUJHO\PRQRHWKQLFFLWLHVLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VSHULSKHU\±%LKDü/LYQR7HVOLüDQG7UHELQMH
The  data  from  cities  whose  populations  experienced  the  worst  plight  in  the  war  were  not  clearly  less  
positive  then  cities  –  like  Livno  –  which  had  on  the  whole  a  less  traumatic  wartime  experience.  It  
might  be  inferred  that  cities  would  divide  not  according  to  the  traumatic  nature  of  the  citizens’  war-­
time  experience,  but  according  to  whether  or  not  it  was  expected  that  compensation  and  restitution  
for  victims  from  their  city  would  be  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  current  residents.  Residents  in  Livno  
and  Banja  Luka  appear  more  favourable  to  protection  for  returnees  in  their  city  than  is  true  across  
WKHFRXQWU\DVDZKROHLQ7HVOLüRU%LMHOMLQDWKHLPSRUWDQFHRISURWHFWLRQIRUUHWXUQHHVDQGIRUWKHLU
rights  was  less  valued  by  respondents.  In  Srebrenica,  this  question  received  more  very  positive  and  
negative  responses  than  the  country-­wide  average.
6DPSOHVIURPHFRQRPLFDOO\GHSULYHGFLWLHV±7HVOLü6UHEUHQLFD/LYQRRU6WRODF±DWWHVWDPRUH
positive  engagement  with  respect  to  a  range  of  features  of  a  reconciliation  process  than  is  true  across  
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the  country.  In  examining  these  cities,  single  factor  explanations  appear  unhelpful.  The  temptation  
to  generalize  about  single  factors  distinguishing  attitudes  across  the  cities  appears  no  more  than  in-­
stinctively  plausible  once  the  evidence  is  examined  carefully.  Trebinje,  for  instance,  is  remarkably  
positive  about  reconciliation  with  Serbia  and  Croatia,  and  this  appears  unsurprising  given  the  town’s  
close  connections  with  Dubrovnik.  But  this  did  not  move  respondents  in  other  cities  near  the  borders  
ZLWK&URDWLDRU6HUELD/LYQRRU%LMHOMLQDRU%UþNRWRVHHWKLVZLGHUUHJLRQDOUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDVPRUH
important  than  it  is  for  the  sample  from  the  country  as  a  whole.  To  explain  this  in  terms  of  the  city’s  
distinctive  economics  has  the  merit  of  simplicity,  but  its  demerits  as  well.  Trebinje  industry  and  com-­
PHUFHDUHSURVSHULQJDQGWKHZRUNIRUFHDUHEHQH¿WWLQJHFRQRPLFDOO\IURPWKHFLW\¶VFORVHUHODWLRQV
with  Croatia.  It  has  a  considerably  lower  level  of  unemployment  than  all  other  cities  in  the  sample  
bar  the  municipalities  of  Sarajevo  and  Banja  Luka.  And  yet  the  average  wage  of  Trebinje  workers  is  
QRWDVKLJKDVLVIRXQGLQ%LKDüDOVRKLVWRULFDOO\GH¿QHGE\LWVVWDWXVQHDUWKHERUGHURI&URDWLDEXW
not  nearly  as  positive  about  cross-­border  reconciliation.
In  conclusion,  further  research  and  the  promotion  of  public  understanding  of  these  results  demands  
a  different  discussion  in  each  of  the  13  cities  included  in  this  study.  Different  levels  of  trust  or  con-­
¿GHQFHDUHSODFHGLQGLIIHUHQWDFWRUVDFURVVWKHFRXQWU\DQGWKLVZRXOGQDWXUDOO\GLIIHUHQWLDWHWKH
format  of  research  and  public  discussion  in  each  city.  Nevertheless,  in  light  of  the  range  of  factors  
which  help  to  distinguish  city  responses,  the  consistent  commitments  favouring  a  socially-­inclusive  
country-­wide  reconciliation  process  represented  in  all  cities  are  all  the  more  remarkable.  Respond-­
ents  from  all  cities  and  all  backgrounds  were  more  or  less  equally  likely  to  favour  making  real  con-­
FHVVLRQVWRWKHQHHGVRIYLFWLPVHTXDOO\OLNHO\WRIDYRXUHGXFDWLRQDODQGGLDORJXHEDVHGDSSURDFKHV
WREXLOGLQJPXWXDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJDFURVVWKHSRSXODWLRQDQGSUHWW\PXFKHTXDOO\OLNHO\WRIDYRXU
a  process  which  promotes  public  recognition  of  the  atrocities  and  genocide  and  all  of  the  suffering  




Our  survey  shows  that  changes  in  the  income  level  and  employment  status  of  respondents  do  corre-­
late  with  some  of  their  responses  –  employment  status  and  stability  of  economic  expectations  even  
PRUHFRQVLVWHQWO\WKDQLQFRPHOHYHO,WGRHVQRWFRQ¿UPWKHVXVSLFLRQVRPHWLPHVKHDUGLQSXEOLF
debate  that  rising  income  levels  will  be  the  best  tool  for  bringing  greater  opening  to  reconciliation.  
Moreover,  in  responding  to  some  questions,  poorer  respondents  proved  more  emphatic  about  sup-­
porting  commitments  to  reconciliation.
&RUUHODWLRQVZHUH¿UVWPHDVXUHGEHWZHHQUHVSRQVHVWRTXHVWLRQVDERXWUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGDUHVSRQG-­
ent’s  joint  household  income.  They  were  then  measured  between  responses  and  a  respondent’s  re-­
ported  income  divided  by  the  number  of  household  members  depending  on  that  income.  This  meas-­
urement  of  higher  and  lower  spending  power  per  person  correlated  more  frequently  than  a  respond-­
ent’s  household  income  level  alone.
Responses  were  then  correlated  with  a  respondent’s  work  situation,  with  respondents  stating  whether  
they  were  employed  full-­time,  part-­time  or  occasionally,  or  unemployed,  and  whether  they  were  stu-­
dents  or  pensioners.  There  are  some  revealing  correlations  with  the  attitudes  of  pensioners  and  stu-­
dents,  who  were,  consistently  and  clearly,  respectively  the  most  and  the  least  supportive  respondent  
FRKRUWVDFURVVWKHVXUYH\(PSOR\HGUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHDOVRJHQHUDOO\PRUHSRVLWLYHLQWKHLUUHVSRQV-­
es  than  unemployed  respondents.  The  results  may  suggest  generally  more  positive  outlooks  from  
respondents  with  greater  levels  of  economic  stability,  whether  or  not  their  income  levels  are  high.  
An  alternative  hypothesis  would  be  to  explain  these  trends  as  responses  to  the  different  experiences  
of  older  and  younger  citizens:   the  wartime  experience  of  citizens  above  pensionable  age   is  more  
likely  to  lead  them  to  believe  reconciliation  activities  are  important,  an  experience  not  shared  by  the  
generation  which  has  grown  up  since  the  war.  In  some  degree,  employment  situation,  or  expectations  
DERXWHPSOR\PHQWDSSHDUPRUHFRQVLVWHQWO\VLJQL¿FDQWWKDQDJHGRHVE\LWVHOI7KHUHVXOWVIRUHP-­
ployment  status  overlap  in  many  respects  with  the  results  correlating  attitudes  with  the  educational  
OHYHODWWDLQHGE\UHVSRQGHQWVWKRXJKWKHUHDUHGLVWLQFWLYH¿QGLQJVDERXWHPSOR\PHQWVWDWXVZKLFK
FDQQRWEHH[SODLQHGE\HGXFDWLRQDOLQÀXHQFHV
When  asked  a  series  of  questions  about  what  reconciliation  activities  should  focus  on  (Q24),  respond-­
ents  with  more  spending  power  per  person  were  more  positive  about  building  mutual  understanding  
among  citizens  and  schoolchildren,  and  about  the  need  to  involve  people  in  reconciliation  processes  
able  to  understand  the  views  of  different  communities.  However,  respondents  living  in  households  
ZLWKOHVVVSHQGLQJSRZHUSHUSHUVRQZHUHPRUHDI¿UPDWLYHDERXWWKHQHHGIRUH[SHUWHYDOXDWLRQV
of  the  causes  of  the  war  and  of  the  reasons  for  military  and  political  leaders’  actions  during  the  war.
(PSOR\PHQWVWDWXVFRUUHODWHGVWLOOPRUHFRQVLVWHQWO\ZLWKDQVZHUVWRWKHVHTXHVWLRQV7KHHPSOR\HG
were  more  positive  about  all  types  of  reconciliation  activity  outlined.  In  responding  to  questions  di-­
rectly  about  the  war,  this  supportive  tendency  was  only  slightly  greater  amongst  employed  respond-­
HQWVWKDQDPRQJVWXQHPSOR\HGUHVSRQGHQWV±LWZDVVLJQL¿FDQWO\JUHDWHUZLWKUHVSHFWWRDOOTXHVWLRQV
about  citizens  and  political  actors  building  trust  and  mutual  understanding.
When  asked  a  series  of  questions  about  the  importance  of  a  range  of  types  of  approach  to  the  next  
steps  in  reconciliation  (Q25),  respondents  with  lower  income  levels  were  more  likely  to  be  posi-­
tive  about  spending  for  the  protection  of  returnees  in  their  city,  where  these  returnees  are  part  of  a  
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constituent  people  in  a  minority  in  that  city.  They  were  more  likely  to  be  positive  about  their  city  
acknowledging  what  had  been  done  to  victims  from  those  populations,  paying  compensation  where  
appropriate.  They  were  also  more  likely  to  approve  support  for  the  memorials  of  these  population  
groups  in  their  city,  and  more  likely  to  view  it  as  important  that  reconciliation  activities  deal  with  
the  suffering  of  people  on  all  sides  in  the  war.  The  employed  were  more  likely  to  deem  political  and  
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPWREHDSULRULW\DQGPRUHOLNHO\WRDI¿UPWKHYDOXHRIDFWLYLWLHVSURPRWLQJDS-­
preciation  of  diversity.  Again,  pensioners  were  on  average  the  most  positive  group  of  respondents,  
and  students  the  least.
Asked  about  priorities  for  government  spending  (Q26),  lower  income  respondents  were  again  more  
OLNHO\WRDI¿UPWKHGHVLUDELOLW\RIIXQGLQJPHPRULDOVDQGSXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQFHQWUHVLQSODFHVZKHUH
atrocities  had  taken  place,  and  of  bringing  schools  to  visit  these  sites.
Respondents  from  households  with  higher  spending  power  per  person  were  more  likely  to  view  as  
important   the   involvement  of  politicians,  women  and   teachers   in  a   trust-­building   /   reconciliation  
process  [Q27].  By  contrast,  they  were  no  more  positive  than  lower  income  respondents  about  the  
LQYROYHPHQWRIUHOLJLRXV¿JXUHVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIYLFWLPVJURXSVDQG¿JXUHVZKRZHUHQRWLGHQ-­
WL¿HGZLWKDQ\RQHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOH7KHHPSOR\HGKRZHYHUZHUHPRUHOLNHO\WKDQXQHPSOR\HG
respondents   to  view  politicians,   teachers  and  socially-­active   religious  people  as   important   in   this  
process.  Again,  pensioners  were  on  average  the  most  positive  group  of  respondents,  and  students  
the  least.
The  gap  between  pensioners  and  students  demands  further  attention.   In  economic   terms  alone,   it  
seems  plausible  to  explain  this  in  terms  of  the  greater  economic  insecurity  students  can  look  forward  
to.  Pensioners  may  have  low  income,  but  many  can  look  forward  to  a  retirement  with  a  relatively  low  
OHYHORI¿QDQFLDOLQVHFXULW\,WPD\ZHOOEHWKDWWKHH[SODQDWLRQIRUWKHSHQVLRQHUVWXGHQWJDSVKRXOG
be  largely  sought  elsewhere:  pensioners  remember  what  the  war  was  like,  the  vast  majority  of  stu-­
GHQWVGRQRWDJUHDWHUSURSRUWLRQRISHQVLRQHUVZHUHVFKRROHGLQQDWLRQDOO\PL[HGFODVVHVZKHUHDV
today’s  youth  are  mostly  schooled  in  mono-­ethnic  classes.  The  impact  of  education,  age  and  wartime  
experience  are  discussed  further  below.
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   7.  National  Identities
7.  National  Identities
The  survey  posed  a  series  of  questions  designed  to  provide  nuanced  information  about  respondents’  
feelings  about  their  national  identity,  and  to  provide  a  basis  for  assessing  elements  of  the  relationship  
between  attitudes  to  national  identity  and  attitudes  to  reconciliation.  The  results  indicate  respondents  
from  Bosniak  and  Croatian  backgrounds  are  on  average  consistently  more  positive  about  the  impor-­
tance  of  reconciliation  activities  than  respondents  from  Serbian  backgrounds,  and  there  may  be  a  
number  of  factors  at  play  which  explain  this.  At  the  same  time,  attitudes  to  national  identities  do  not  
consistently  correlate  with  attitudes  to  reconciliation.  And  a  large  proportion  of  respondents  do  not  
see  their  national  identity  as  politically  important.
Asked  how  they  see  their  national  identity  (Q12),  36.8%  indicated  Bosniak,  32%  indicated  Serbi-­
an,  and  23.9%  Croatian.  For  the  respondents  identifying  with  the  three  constitutional  peoples,  over  
DOVRLGHQWL¿HGZLWKWKHUHOLJLRXVFRPPXQLW\FRPPRQO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKDWQDWLRQDOLGHQWLW\
–  Catholics  with  Croatian  national  identity,  Muslims  with  Bosniak  national  identity,  and  Orthodox  
with  Serbian  national  identity.
,Q D UHOLJLRXV VHQVH  RI %RVQLDNV LGHQWL¿HG WKHPVHOYHV DV0XVOLPV ZHUH DWKHLVWV 
Catholics,  1%  Orthodox,  1%  agnostics,  and  1%  chose  not  to  say.
RI6HUEV LGHQWL¿HG WKHPVHOYHVDV2UWKRGR[&KULVWLDQVZHUHDWKHLVWVDJQRVWLFV
chose  other,  and  1%  did  not  respond.
RI&URDWVLGHQWL¿HGWKHPVHOYHVDV&DWKROLFVDVDJQRVWLFVDVDWKHLVWVRWKHUGLG
not  answer.
The  majority  of  respondents  who  did  not  answer  the  question  related  to  national  identity  also  did  not  
DQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQRQUHOLJLRXVDI¿OLDWLRQ±7KHUHVWRIWKHVHQRQUHVSRQGHQWVZHUH2UWKRGR[
14%,  Bosniaks  10%,  Catholics  3%,  atheists  3%,  and  other  3%.
After  cross-­referencing  the  question  on  national  identity  with  the  claim:  “I  am  a  minority  in  a  re-­
OLJLRXVVHQVH´D¿JXUHLVREWDLQHGLQGLFDWLQJWKDWRIUHVSRQGHQWVDUHPLQRULWLHVLQDUHOLJLRXV
sense.  The  majority  of  them  belong  to  national  minorities  (70%).  Of  the  constituent  peoples  of  Bos-­
nia  and  Herzegovina,  31%  of  the  Croat  respondents  believe  they  are  part  of  a  religious  minority,  19%  
of  the  Serbs,  and  18%  of  the  Bosniaks.
Among  the  161  respondents  (6.2%)  who  gave  other  answers,  63  (2.4%)  chose  to  describe  their  na-­
tional  identity  in  other  terms:  25  (1%)  chose  Bosnian  and  Herzegovinian,  8  chose  Bosnian,  7  chose  
Herzegovinian,  10  chose  ‘Yugoslav’  and  10  indicated  mixed  backgrounds  (Bosnian  and  Serb,  Croat  
DQG6HUE HWF  IXUWKHU UHVSRQGHQWV  LGHQWL¿HGZLWKQDWLRQDOPLQRULWLHV UHVSRQGHQWV
gave  other  responses,  and  75  (2.9%)  indicated  that  they  preferred  not  to  answer  the  question.  In  ad-­
dition,  29  respondents  (1.1%)  did  not  answer  the  question  at  all.
In  their  answers  to  questions  about  trust-­building  and  reconciliation,  the  average  for  the  sample  of  
respondents  identifying  as  Bosnian  and  Croatian  was  consistently  more  positive  than  the  average  
amongst   respondents   identifying  as  Serbian  about   the   importance  of   the   activities   and  actors   in-­
YROYHGLQWKHVHSURFHVVHV)RUPDQ\TXHVWLRQV%RVQLDNUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHRQDYHUDJHPRUHDI¿UPD-­
tive  than  Croatian  respondents  were,  and  the  reverse  was  also  true  for  as  many  other  questions.  The  
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10  respondents  identifying  with  national  minorities  were  consistently  high  in  the  rankings  they  gave  
to  reconciliation  activities  and  actors,  while  the  group  which  chose  alternative  identities  varied  far  
more,  providing  high  rankings  in  response  to  some  questions,  and  low  rankings  in  response  to  others.  
'LIIHUHQWHGXFDWLRQDOOHYHOVPD\LQÀXHQFHVRPHRIWKHUHVXOWVDKLJKHUSURSRUWLRQRIUHVSRQGHQWV
IURP6HUELDQEDFNJURXQGVKDG¿QLVKHGHGXFDWLRQHDUO\WKDQZDVWUXHRIWKH%RVQLDNDQG&URDWLDQ
samples,  and  a  higher  proportion  of  respondents  identifying  as  Croatian  or  preferring  an  alternative  
identity  had  completed  higher  degrees.  There  was  also  considerable  variation  within  each  of   the  
three  constituent  peoples.  Consequently,  the  divergent  trend  should  be  understood  not  as  a  radical  
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWKUHHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHVEXWDVDUHÀHFWLRQRIWKHVWUHQJWKRIGLIIHUHQWUH-­
sponses  favouring  reconciliation  activities  within  each  national  sample.
Question  13  prompted  respondents  to  choose  any  of  four  options  which  they  felt  applied  to  their  
feeling  about  the  importance  of  their  national  identity.  2.5%  of  respondents  chose  not  to  answer.
When  asked  whether  their  national  belonging  was  important  when  they  made  decisions  about  whom  
to  socialize  with  (Q13/1),  only  194  (7.4%)  ticked  ‘yes’,  2348  (90.1%)  indicated  ‘no’.
When  asked  whether  nationality  was  important  for  their  vote  (Q13/2),  210  (8.1%)  indicated  ‘yes’,  
2331  (89.4%)  ‘no’.  Croatian  respondents  were  more  likely  to  tick  ‘Yes’  than  the  average  across  the  
sample,  while  Serbian  and  Bosniak  respondents  were  close  to  the  sample  average.
When  asked  (13/3)  whether  nationality  was  important  to  them  because  it  was  the  group  they  felt  they  
belonged  to,  1029  (39.5%)  indicated  ‘yes’,  1512  (58%)  ‘no’.  Croatian  and  Serbian  respondents  were  
more  likely  than  the  average  across  the  sample  to  agree  with  this.
When  asked  (13/4)  to  indicate  whether  nationality  had  no  importance  to  them  at  all,  1169  (44.9%)  
DJUHHGDQGGLVDJUHHG7KLVWLPH&URDWLDQDQG6HUELDQUHVSRQGHQWVZHUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\
less  likely  to  agree  than  the  sample  as  a  whole.  The  average  across  the  sample  of  Bosniak  respond-­
ents  was  close  to  the  sample-­wide  average.
The  groups  who  responded  ‘yes’  to  Q13/3  and  ‘no’  to  Q13/4  about  the  feeling  and  importance  of  
national  group  belonging  were  more  consistent  in  their  responses  to  the  questions  about  priorities  
for   a   trust-­building   and   reconciliation   process   in  Q24   than  was   true   of   other   questions:   support  
for  reconciliation  activities  correlated  positively  with  being  more  likely  to  feel  a  national  group  is  
LPSRUWDQWLQWHUPVRIEHORQJLQJ7KHRQO\WZRRSWLRQVLQ4IRUZKLFKWKHUHZHUHQRVLJQL¿FDQW
correlations  with  Questions  13/3  and  4  were  about  the  importance  of  dialogue  activities  to  establish  
mutual  understanding  and  the  importance  of  programmes  focused  on  understanding  between  young  
people  –  these  options  were  as  likely  to  be  supported  by  those  for  whom  nationality  is  not  important  
as  it  was  by  those  for  whom  it  is  important.
7KHUHODWLYHO\VPDOOJURXSZKRUHVSRQGHGµ\HV¶WRDQGZHUHVLJQL¿FDQWO\PRUHOLNHO\WR
indicate  support  for  the  involvement  of  believers  in  reconciliation  activities.  Those  who  indicated  
that   their  national   identity  was  important  for   their  decisions  about  whom  to  socialize  with  (13/1)  
were  also  more  likely  to  value  expert  judgements  about  the  experience  of  the  war.  Those  who  indi-­
cated  by  contrast  that  their  national  identity  did  not  affect  choices  about  friendships  were  more  likely  
WKDQWKHDYHUDJHDFURVVWKHUHVSRQGHQWVDPSOHWRDI¿UPWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIFLWL]HQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
a  role  in  reconciliation  activities  for  people  who  can  understand  others’  views,  and  of  the  importance  
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of  expert   judgements  about  the  causes  of   the  war.  Those  who  indicated  national   identity  affected  
their  vote  (13/2)  were  more  likely  than  the  average  across  the  sample  to  indicate  the  importance  of  
apologies  from  those  in  positions  of  responsibility  in  the  1990s,  and  of  expert  judgements  about  the  
causes  of  the  war.
The  responses  given  in  Q13  provided  some  further  correlations  with  responses  to  Questions  25,  26  
and  27,  without  providing  a  consistent  explanation  for  preferred  approaches  to  trust-­building  and  
reconciliation.
Factors  in  Reconciliation:  Religion,  Local  Conditions,  People  and  Trust
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8.  Politics
One  of  the  most  valuable  features  of  the  data  from  this  survey  is  the  inclusion  of  a  large  proportion  
of  citizens  who  chose  not  to  vote  at  the  last  elections  at  state  and  entity  levels,  or  who  have  otherwise  
indicated  their  dissatisfaction  with  voting  choices.  As  might  be  expected,  these  respondents  indicat-­
ed  lower  levels  of  satisfaction  with  life  in  the  country,  low  levels  of  trust  in  political  actors,  and  lower  
levels  of  trust  in  a  number  of  forms  of  reconciliation  process.  Those  who  voted  for  the  governing  
parties  –  the  most-­established  parties  which  aim  to  represent  each  of  the  three  constituent  peoples  
–  are  not  necessarily  happy  about  their  choice,  nor  are  they  necessarily  more  happy  about  the  state  
of  the  country  than  those  voting  for  opposition  parties.  And  yet  on  average  they  do  have  a  different  
attitude  to  the  future  of  the  country,  one  which  cuts  against  assumptions  about  the  mainstream  par-­
ties  deriving  strength  from  an  intransigent  form  of  ethnonationalism.  The  most  consistent  levels  of  
support  for  formal  reconciliation  processes  came  from  those  who  at  the  last  elections  voted  for  one  
of  the  governing  parties,  and  these  voters  were  also  more  likely  to  support  an  engagement  with  the  
country’s  history  than  those  who  voted  for  opposition  parties.
In  what  follows,  comparisons  are  drawn  not  between  voters  for  particular  parties,  but  between  those  
who  indicated  that  they  voted  for  the  parties  which  have  governed  in  post-­war  Bosnia  (30.9%  of  
the   total  sample),   those  who  voted  for  smaller  opposition  parties  (5.9%),   those  who  did  not  vote  
(10.9%),   those  who  elected  not   to   indicate   for  whom  they  voted  or  whether   they  voted   (43.1%),  
DQG¿QDOO\WKRVHZKRGLGQRWUHVSRQGWRWKLVTXHVWLRQDWDOO7KHLQWHUHVWKHUHLVQRWLQWKH
SHUIRUPDQFHRISDUWLFXODUSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVEXWLQWKHSUR¿OHVRIWKRVHZKRYRWHGIRUFRQWLQXLW\RI
government,  those  who  voted  for  change,  those  who  did  not  vote,  and  the  remainder.  The  43.1%  of  
UHVSRQGHQWVZKRLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH\SUHIHUUHGQRWWRVWDWHWKHLUHOHFWRUDOSUHIHUHQFHUHÀHFWWKHKLJK
levels  of  mistrust  in  the  political  uses  to  be  made  by  such  data.  A  large  proportion  of  those  respond-­
HQWVZLOODOVREHUHÀHFWLQJDJHQHUDOVHQVHRIGLVDIIHFWLRQZLWKOLIHLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDDQG
a  distance  from  the  party  political  system.
Questions  19  and  20:  The  state  of  the  country  and  priorities  for  change
Those  who  voted  for  the  governing  parties  share  a  general  popular  dissatisfaction  with  life  in  Bosnia  
and  Herzegovina,  and  with  the  state  of   the  country’s  politics.  A  majority  of  respondents  declared  
their  dissatisfaction  with  the  quality  of  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (76.4%),  while  only  21.7%  
VDLGWKH\ZHUHVDWLV¿HG4XHVWLRQ7KHLUIRFXVZDVQRWSROLWLFDOEXWHFRQRPLFFKDQJH,QRUGHUWR
make  life  better,  60.8%  of  respondents  indicated  that  improvements  in  economy  are  the  greatest  pri-­
ority  (Question  20).  By  contrast,  only  39.9%  of  the  sample  believed  that  political  change  was  more  
important  in  creating  a  better  quality  of  life,  and  still  less  –  only  28.7%  –  indicated  that  social  change  
was  the  most  important  priority  for  improving  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  On  the  other  hand,  the  
TXDOLW\RIVRFLDOUHODWLRQVDUHQRWGHWHUPLQLQJLQWKLVVHQVH±RIWKRVHVXUYH\HGFRQ¿UPHGWKLV
while  28.7%  said  improvement  of  social  relations  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  will  make  their  life  
EHWWHU$VPDOOEXWVLJQL¿FDQWQXPEHURIUHVSRQGHQWVWR4XHVWLRQUHMHFWHGDOOWKUHHRSWLRQVDQG
wrote  out  their  own  recipe  for  improving  the  country,  much  of  which  underlines  the  inadequacies  at-­
WULEXWHGWRWKHSROLWLFDOV\VWHPFUHDWLQJDQDGHTXDWHJRYHUQPHQWWKH¿JKWDJDLQVWFULPLQDOV
and  corruption  (0.6%),  differention  of  the  Federation  from  Republika  Srpska  (0.5%),  a  politics  fa-­
YRXULQJHPSOR\PHQWUHFRQFLOLDWLRQDQGWROHUDQFHUHDI¿UPDWLRQRIPRUDODQGHWKLFV
(0.2%),  rule  of  law  and  good  laws  (0.2%),  and  impact  on  people’s  awareness  (0.2%).
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The  data  revealed  a  different  trend  amongst  responses  to  the  satisfaction  with  life  question  amongst  
WKRVHZKRYRWHGDWWKHODVWHOHFWLRQVDQGWKRVHZKRGLGQRW7KHPRVWXQVDWLV¿HGZLWKOLIHLQ%RVQLD
and  Herzegovina  (85.9%)  were  those  who  did  not  vote.  80.4%  of  those  who  voted  for  opposition  
SDUWLHVZHUHQRWVDWLV¿HGZLWKOLIHLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQD7KHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHVHYRWHUV
and  those  who  voted  for  the  parties  in  government  was  strikingly  small:  79%  of  those  who  voted  for  
WKHJRYHUQLQJSDUWLHVRQWKHHQWLW\DQGVWDWHOHYHOVZHUHQRWVDWLV¿HGZLWKOLIHLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJR-­
vina.  75.7%  of  those  who  preferred  not  to  say  for  which  parties  they  voted  expressed  dissatisfaction  
with  life  in  the  country.
Comparable  divergences  with  respect  to  priorities  for  change  in  the  country  were  remarkably  slight:  
There  is  strikingly  little  difference  of  perspective  to  questions  about  whether  economic,  political  or  
social  change  should  be  prioritized  between  the  responses  of  those  who  voted  for  parties  in  gov-­
HUQPHQWDQGWKRVHZKRGLGQRW$FRPSDUDEOHSDWWHUQLVUHÀHFWHGLQDWWLWXGHVWRWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
economic  change  for  an  improvement  in  the  country’s  life.  Improvements  in  the  economy  proved  
equally  important  for  those  who  voted  for  parties  in  government  (64.4%),  those  who  supported  op-­
position  parties  (63%),  and  those  who  chose  not  to  say  for  whom  they  voted  (64%).  Amongst  those  
who  indicated  that  they  did  not  vote  in  the  last  entity  and  state  elections,  59.6%  indicated  that  eco-­
nomic  change  was  the  priority  for  improving  life  in  the  country.
The   importance  of   political   reform  again   saw  only   slight   differences  between  voter   and  non-­voter  
groups.  40.9%  of  those  who  voted  for  oppositional  countries  and  40.9%  of  those  who  voted  but  pre-­
ferred  not  to  declare  their  political  preferences  consider  this  to  be  the  primary  path  to  change  for  the  
better.  By  contrast,  37.3%  of  respondents  who  voted  for  the  ruling  parties  and  37.9%  of  those  who  in-­
dicated  that  they  did  not  vote  judged  that  the  political  dimension  is  the  most  important  area  for  change.
Improving  social  relations  proved  the  least  important  for  all  groups.  It  was  the  preferred  path  for  
change  for  31.4%  of  those  who  chose  not  to  say  for  whom  they  voted,  for  24.8%  of  those  who  voted  
for  parties  in  government,  for  24.8%  of  those  who  did  not  vote,  and  24%  of  those  who  supported  
opposition  parties.
Question  21:  Would  a  reconciliation  process  have  an  impact?
Voters  and  non-­voters  present  slightly  different  trends  again  with  respect  to  the  likely  impact  of  a  
reconciliation  process.
On  a  local  level,  the  most  positive  response  came  from  those  who  indicated  that  they  did  not  vote  
(57.6%).  Similarly,  more  than  half  of  respondents  who  chose  not  to  say  for  whom  they  voted  believe  
that  attempts  to  build  a  relationship  of  trust  and  honesty  would  not  have  affected  the  future  of  the  city  
and  local  region  in  which  they  live.  The  trend  was  slightly  different  amongst  voters  who  indicated  
that  they  had  voted  for  a  particular  party:  53.5%  of  those  who  voted  for  opposition  parties  and  52.5%  
of  those  who  voted  for  ruling  parties  said  these  initiatives  would  make  an  impact  on  their  local  areas.
A  comparable  pattern  was  evident  with  respect  to  reconciliation  and  trust-­building  initiatives  at  the  
country-­wide  level.  76.8%  of  the  total  sample  surveyed  said  these  initiatives  would  have  a  serious  
impact  on  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  most  positive  were  those  who  voted  for  the  ruling  parties:  
79.1%.  At  the  other  end  of  the  spectrum,  73.9%  of  those  who  did  not  vote  agreed  they  would  have  a  
serious  impact  at  this  level.
The  gap  between  the  attitudes  of  voters  and  non-­voters  is  not  wide,  but  it  is  fairly  consistent.
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Question  22:  should  the  focus  be  on  the  constituent  peoples?
Almost  90  %  of  respondents  said  that  reconciliation  and  trust  building  initiatives  should  be  focused  
on  relations  between  the  three  constituent  peoples  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  The  highest  level  of  
support  for  this  came  from  those  who  did  not  vote  in  the  last  state  or  entity  elections  (92.3%).  The  
ORZHVWOHYHORIVXSSRUWFDPHIURPWKRVHZKRVXSSRUWHGRSSRVLWLRQSDUWLHV7KLV¿JXUHLV
still  strikingly  high,  given  that  a  good  number  of  these  parties  are  committed  to  overcoming  the  po-­
litical  dominance  of  the  main  parties  associated  with  each  of  the  constituent  peoples.
Question  23:  should  reconciliation  activities  focus  on  the  acts  of  past  governments?
More  than  half  of  the  respondents  in  this  study  considered  topics  related  to  the  past  to  be  important  
(14.8%  very  important,  and  38.3%  as  important).  By  contrast,  13.4%  said  these  topics  are  not  im-­
portant,  and  for  17.4%  these  topics  present  an  obstacle  for  the  processes  of  reconciliation  and  trust  
building.  16.1  %  did  not  answer  the  question.
7KHPRVWDI¿UPDWLYHRIDGHOLEHUDWHIRFXVRQSDVWUHODWHGWRSLFVZHUHWKRVHUHVSRQGHQWVZKRYRWHG
for  the  ruling  parties  in  the  last  elections:  42.6%  indicate  these  topics  are  important,  17.5%  say  very  
important.  Those  who  did  not  vote  were  also  supportive,  albeit  with  a  lower  percentage  –  36.2%  
indicated  that  these  topics  are  important,  13.4%  said  that  a  focus  on  the  past  is  very  important.
The  project  of  a  reconciliation  process  focused  on  the  past  remains  most  controversial  amongst  those  
who  did  not  vote  for  one  of  the  governing  parties  in  the  last  elections.  25%  of  those  who  did  not  vote  
and  20%  of  those  who  voted  for  opposition  parties  indicated  that  these  topics  are  actually  an  obstacle  




















What  is  the  place  of  issues  arising  from  the  country's  past  in  such  a  
process,  in  your  opinon?
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   8.  Politics
Question  24:  How  much  are  politicians  trusted  relative  to  other  actors?
The  table  below  compares  the  level  of  importance  for  reconciliation  process  attributed  to  politicians  
with  the  importance  attributed  to  non-­political  actors.  The  most  valued  participants  in  the  process  
of  reconciliation  were  those  who  could  advocate  for  all  citizens  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  and  not  
exlusively  for  one  of  its  constituent  peoples:  51.1%  of  those  surveyed  considered  their  role  to  be  
very  important,  and  an  additional  21.6%  said  it  would  be  important.  By  contrast,  only  29%  indicated  
that  the  role  of  politicans  in  a  reconciliation  process  was  very  important,  and  19.8%  declared  their  
role  was  not  important  at  all  –  the  highest  percentage  of  all  types  of  actor  listed.  The  variety  of  cat-­
HJRULHVLQFOXGHGLQ4XHVWLRQXQGHUOLQHVWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKHVHGLVWLQFWLYHUHVSRQVHVUHÀHFWHG
DJHQHUDOVHQVHRIGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKSDUW\SROLWLFV7KH\DOVRUHÀHFWWKHGLYHUJHQFHEHWZHHQWKH
preferences  of  different  groups  within  the  sample:  religious  leaders  and  socially-­active  religious  in-­
dividuals  elicited  only  slightly  stronger  support  than  politicians,  but  were  also  deemed  unimportant  
E\VOLJKWO\VPDOOHUQXPEHUVWHDFKHUVYLFWLPVDQGZRPHQUHFHLYHGVWLOOVWURQJHUOHYHOVRIVXSSRUW
and  still  fewer  indicated  they  were  likely  to  be  unimportant  to  reconciliation  processes.
Graph  8.2
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who  described  their  role  during  the  war  as  “all  of  the  above”  or  “none  of  the  above”.
In  this  second  survey,  it  was  again  shown  that  veterans  were  the  most  committed  to  support  recon-­
ciliation  and  trust-­building  initiatives.  In  this  second  survey,  regardless  of  the  category  respondents  
LGHQWL¿HGWKHPVHOYHVZLWKDOOUHVSRQGHQWVLQGLFDWHGDSRVLWLYHDWWLWXGHWRDOOUHFRQFLOLDWLRQLQLWLD-­
tives.  It  was  nevertheless  clear  that  wartime  experiences  correlated  with  different  responses  to  the  
importance  of  different  types  of  initiative.
The  survey  examined  the  wartime  experience  of  respondents  through  six  given  options:  soldier,  ci-­
vilian,  refugee,  prison  camp  inmate,  “None  of  the  above”,  and  “I’d  rather  not  say”.  The  largest  group  
in  the  sample  were  refugees  (36.8%),  then  civilians  (26.2%),  then  respondents  who  chose  “None  of  
the  above”  (21%),  then  soldiers  (13.1%),  then  respondents  who  chose  “I’d  rather  not  say”  (6.6%)  
and  lastly  prison  camp  inmates  (2.1%).
Respondents  who  were  soldiers  during  the  war  answered  all  questions  on  trust-­building  initiatives  
encompassed  in  Question  24  more  positively.  They  were  much  more  likely  to  insist  that  initiatives  
should  focus  on  enabling  citizens  to  understand  each  other  better,  on  agreement  among  experts  on  
the  experiences  of  the  population  during  the  war,  on  the  importance  of  determining  the  causes  of  the  
war  by  experts,  and  on  ensuring  that  political  leaders  seriously  engage  with  the  people  they  represent.
Graph  9.1  
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   9.  Wartime  Experience




engage  seriously  with  the  people  they  represent.  It  remains  uncertain  whether  this  indicates  a  gen-­
uinely  high  level  of  expectation  that  politicians  might  give  a  greater  contribution  to  the  process  of  
reconciliation  and  become  more  engaged  with  the  people  they  represent,  or  whether  it  is  rather  more  
indicative  of  a  generally  low  degree  of  expectation  that  currently  politicians  seek  to  work  in  the  best  
interests  of  citizens.
Respondents  who  were  refugees  during  the  war  were  more  likely  to  see  the  following  as  important:  
HQFRXUDJLQJVFKRROFKLOGUHQWRWDONDERXWWKHH[SHFWDWLRQVWKH\KROGLQFRPPRQIRUWKHLUIXWXUHWKH
FRQWULEXWLRQWREHPDGHE\SHRSOHZLWKDVLQFHUHSHUVRQDOIDLWKDQGUHDFKLQJDQDJUHHPHQWEHWZHHQ
experts  on  the  experiences  of  the  population  during  the  war.  Those  who  went  through  prison  camps  
during  the  war  also  placed  higher  expectations  on  an  agreement  among  experts,  both  on  this  point  
and  in  determining  the  causes  of  the  war.
Respondents  who  belonged   to  none  of   the   listed  groups  during   the  war   tended   to  answer  all   the  
VXETXHVWLRQVIRU4ZLWKVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWYDOXHV7KLV LVPRVWUHDGLO\XQGHUVWDQGDEOH LQ
light  of  the  trend  that  younger  people  in  general  showed  less  enthusiasm  about  all  types  of  reconcil-­
iation  initiative.  Among  those  who  declared  they  had  been  “None  of  the  above”  during  the  war,  the  
majority  was,  as  might  be  expected,  younger  than  18  years  of  age  (75.4%).
Respondents  who  preferred  not  to  report  what  they  had  been  or  done  during  the  war  were  more  likely  
WRYDOXHDQLQLWLDWLYHIRFXVHGRQVHULRXVHQFRXQWHUEHWZHHQDFWLYHSROLWLFDO¿JXUHVDQGZHUHPRUH
negative  about  enabling  citizens  to  understand  different  perspectives  concerning  this  issue,  to  under-­
stand  each  other  better,  about  agreement  among  experts  on  the  experience  of  the  population  during  
the  war,  and  on  ensuring  that  political  leaders  seriously  engage  with  the  people  they  represent.  This  
correlates  with  a  general  tendency  for  those  who  chose  not  to  indicate  a  role  during  the  war  to  show  
slightly  more  skepticism  about  reconciliation  initiatives.
Factors  in  Reconciliation:  Religion,  Local  Conditions,  People  and  Trust
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10.  Education
While  the  levels  of  education  attained  by  respondents  may  be  quite  precise  and  widely  understood,  
the  impact  of  those  levels  of  education  might  be  understood  quite  differently,  either  through  group-­
ing  educational  cohorts  differently,  or  through  divergent  expectations  about  the  relationship  between  
HGXFDWLRQDOOHYHOVDQGRXWFRPHV:KHUHDVLQD81'3VXUYH\SXEOLVKHGLQWKRVHZLWKDKLJKHU
level  of  education  expressed  more  support  for  activities  contributing  to  reconciliation  and  trust-­build-­
ing  across  peoples  and  citizens,  the  results  of  this  survey  indicate  scope  for  different  perspectives.  
:KDWIROORZVLVRQO\DQLQWURGXFWLRQWRWKH¿QGLQJVRIWKHVXUYH\ZKLFKZLOOEHIXUWKHUFODUL¿HGLQ
publications  in  2014-­2015.
In  this  survey,  respondents  gave  the  following  answers  regarding  their  level  of  education:  1.3%  of  
UHVSRQGHQWVLQGLFDWHGWKH\KDGQRIRUPDOHGXFDWLRQKDG¿QLVKHGHOHPHQWDU\VFKRRO
secondary  school,  30.3%  had  been  to  college  or  university,  and  the  highest  level  of  education  –  a  
master’s  degree  or  doctorate  –  had  been  earned  by  3.2%.  Slightly  less  than  2%  chose  not  to  answer  
this  question.
When  asked  whether  a  serious  attempt  to  build  relationships  of  trust  and  honesty  among  religious  
and  national  groups  would  have  an  impact  on  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  a  larger  number  of  respond-­
ents  with  higher  education  indicated  that  it  would  than  was  true  of  respondents  with  a  lower  level  
























Finished  college  or  university
Master’s  degree  or  doctorate  
I'd  rather  not  say
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   10.  Education
OHYHORURQDZLGHUUHJLRQDOOHYHO%L+&URDWLD6HUELDQRVLJQL¿FDQWFRUUHODWLRQVWRWKHOHYHORI
education  attained  by  respondents  appeared.
:KLOHKLJKHUOHYHOVRIHGXFDWLRQFRUUHODWHGZLWKPRUHSRVLWLYHDI¿UPDWLRQVRIWKHLPSDFWWREHH[-­
pected  from  a  reconciliation  process  across  the  whole  country,  there  were  no  differences  between  the  
responses  of  educational  cohorts  with  respect  to  whether  or  not  such  initiatives  should  be  focused  
RQWKHFRQVWLWXHQWSHRSOHV$VLJQL¿FDQWPDMRULW\RIUHVSRQGHQWVRIDOOHGXFDWLRQDOOHYHOVUHFRJQL]HG
that  relationships  between  the  constituent  peoples  lie  in  the  centre  of  the  reconciliation  process  –  
relationships   among   the   three   constituent   peoples   are   not  merely   an   issue   imposed   either   by   an  
educated  or  political  elite,  nor  out  of  a  populist  interest  disconnected  from  a  genuine  sense  of  citizen  
interests.  Why  it  is  seen  as  important  deserves  further  research.
A  positive  correlation  obtained  between  higher  education  and  greater  levels  of  support  for  the  prop-­
ositions  that  an  initiative  for  building  relationships  founded  on  trust  should  be  focused  on  serious  
encounters  between  politicians  and  on  encouraging  school  children  to  talk  about  their  expectations  
IRUWKHIXWXUHZKLFKWKH\VKDUH(YHQPRUHKLJKO\HGXFDWHGUHVSRQGHQWVDWPDVWHU¶VDQGGRFWRUDO
OHYHOVZHUHHVSHFLDOO\ OLNH WRDI¿UPWKHQHHGIRUFRQWULEXWLRQVIURPSHRSOHZKRFDQXQGHUVWDQG
the  perspectives  of  members  of  different  communities.  On  the  other  hand,  and  paradoxically,   the  
same  respondents  who  hold  doctoral  or  master’s  degrees  had  the  least  trust  in  expert  contributions  
to  the  process  of  reconciliation  and  building  trust.  This  was  true  regardless  of  whether  experts  were  
expected  to  be  engaged  with  the  experience  of  the  population  during  the  war,  or  with  the  reasons  for  
the  actions  of  military  and  political  leaders  during  the  war,  or  with  the  causes  of  the  war.  This  can  
be  interpreted  in  two  ways:  either  people  who  are  engaged  with  science  have  enough  experience  and  
HQRXJKNQRZOHGJHDERXWWKHPHWKRGRORJLFDOGLI¿FXOWLHVLQYROYHGLQDFFHVVLQJDXWKHQWLFDQGUHOLDEOH
data  that  they  do  not  trust  these  processes,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  familiar  with  attempts,  in  
the  past  and/or  recently,  to  shape  data,  to  blame  “the  other  side”,  or  to  emphasize  desirable  and  to  
cover  undesirable  results.
Answers  to  the  question  “Do  you  believe  it  would  be  important  for  the  process  of  reconciliation  if  a  
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOUHIRUPHQGHGHQWUHQFKHGFRQÀLFWVEHWZHHQSDUWLHVZKLFKUHSUHVHQWWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
peoples”  showed  that  there  were  differences  among  respondents  with  different  level  of  education:  
the  same  level  of  support  for  the  proposition  was  given  by  those  with  no  education  and  by  those  
with  a  university  degree,  and  a  lower  level  of  support  was  given  by  those  who  had  graduated  from  
elementary  or  secondary  school.
Those  with  higher  education  were  less  likely  to  support  public  spending  on  memorial  and  information  
centres  at  sites  of  atrocities  than  those  with  lower  education  were,  and  the  same  was  true  for  educa-­
tional  programmes  designed  to  bring  young  people  from  all  over  the  country  to  memorial  centres  in  
order  to  help  them  to  understand  the  past  and  the  lessons  it  teaches.  By  contrast,  more  highly  educated  
respondents  gave  higher  rates  of  approval  to  spending  money  from  public  funds  for  educational  pro-­
grammes  which  help  young  people  to  address  negative  prejudices  and  to  help  them  to  understand  the  
common  interests  of  citizens  of  different  backgrounds.  This  was  also  partially  the  case  for  support  for  
community-­led  initiatives  which  identify  foundations  for  trust  and  public  cooperation.  Put  in  other  
words,  people  with  higher  education  gave  less  credit  to  the  importance  of  clearing  up  issues  from  the  
past  and  more  to  activities  which  build  the  future.  In  contrast,  differences  in  level  of  education  played  
no  part  in  evaluations  of  the  value  of  increasing  support  for  victims  of  serious  crimes  in  the  1990s.
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Finally,  respondents  with  higher  education  tended  to  offer  distinctive  responses  to  the  importance  
of  involving  different  actors  in  the  reconciliation  process  (Question  27).  Respondents  with  higher  
education  showed  their  most  strongly  marked  preference  for  the  role  to  be  played  by  teachers,  then  
for  the  role  of  politicians,  then  for  women  to  a  slightly  lesser  extent,  and  slightly  less  still  for  the  
UROHRIUHOLJLRXV¿JXUHVDQGVRFLDOO\DFWLYHEHOLHYHUV7KLVPRUHKLJKO\HGXFDWHGSDUWRIWKHVDPSOH
showed  least  appreciation  for  the  role  to  be  played  by  groups  which  represent  victims  and  vulnerable  
members  of  the  population.
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   11.  Age
11.  Age
7KHUHVXOWVEURNHQGRZQE\DJHJURXSVZHUHVLJQL¿FDQWDQGDOVRLQWHUHVWLQJ7KHUHLVDWURXEOHVRPH
trend  that  younger  people,  especially  those  who  do  not  remember  the  war  or  who  were  not  even  born  
at  that  time,  appear  to  be  more  indifferent  to  the  issues  associated  with  reconciliation  and  trust-­build-­
ing.  Perhaps  this  can  be  explained  by  a  general  youthful   indifference.  At  the  same  time,  younger  
respondents  also  appear  to  have  slightly  more  negative  attitudes  to  the  question  of  trust  in  general.  
7KLVSUREDEO\UHÀHFWVZKDWWKHVHQHZJHQHUDWLRQVOHDUQDERXWWKHZDUDQGWKH³RWKHU´IURPSDUHQWV
the  media  or  school.
Regarding  the  attitudes  of  respondents  from  different  age  groups  to  the  questions  about  facing  the  
past  grouped  in  Question  24,   there  are  clear  differences  between  the  youngest  population  (below  
18)  and  the  older  generations  (especially  above  51).  Younger  respondents  rated  all  suggestions  as  
less  important,  while  older  respondents  (especially  those  above  51)  regarded  them  as  more  impor-­
tant.  The  most  striking  divergence  between  the  younger  and  the  older  generations  was  seen  in  their  
evaluations  of  the  potential  importance  of  a  “serious  encounter  between  important  personalities  in  
political  life  today”.  The  same  difference  is  evident  in  answers  to  Question  27,  on  the  importance  of  
getting  different  citizens  involved  in  the  process  of  reconciliation,  where  the  younger  respondents  
DJDLQH[SHFWHGOHVVIURPSROLWLFLDQVWKDQROGHUUHVSRQGHQWVGLG7KLV¿WVWKHWUHQGLQUHVSRQVHVWR
Question  10,  according  to  which  those  under  18  year  olds  with  no  wartime  experience  showed  less  
interest  and  enthusiasm  for  the  entire  reconciliation  process.
This  divergence  was  again  evident  in  answers  to  Question  25,  focused  on  the  importance  of  a  range  
of  options  for  the  next  step  in  reconciliation  and  trust-­building,  such  as  “special  treatment  and  pro-­
tection  for  minorities”,  “apologies  of  political  leaders”.  Again,  younger  respondents  attributed  less  
importance  to  all  listed  suggestions.  In  general,  the  older  the  respondents  were,  the  more  likely  they  
were  to  rate  the  given  options  as  more  important.  The  difference  is  the  most  striking  between  the  
category  of  the  youngest  (younger  than  18)  and  the  oldest  (above  51).
Regarding  Question  26,  focused  on  a  series  of  propositions  about  spending  public  funds  on  different  
educational  and  social  projects  aimed  at  building  trust,  the  majority  of  all  age  groups  support  spend-­
ing  on  such  initiatives  (between  51.1%  and  91.5%).
The  general   tendency  differentiating  a  more  positive  older  cohort   from  a  more  negative  younger  
cohort  does  not  apply  for  all  questions.  In  answering  the  question  about  whether  they  approved  of  
public  spending  on  building  “memorial  and  information  centres  at  sites  of  atrocities”,  respondents  
from  the  age  group  of  18-­30  expressed  more  commitment  than  other  age  groups.  There  were  no  dif-­
ferences  between  different  age  categories  in  answers  to  the  question  of  whether  public  funds  should  
be  used  to  support  “educational  programmes  designed  to  take  young  people  to  memorial  sites  so  that  
they  could  learn  about  the  past  and  about  the  lessons  that  can  be  learnt  for  today”.  The  majority  of  
all  age  groups  support  public  expenditure  on  this  type  of  initiative.
Across  the  sample  as  a  whole,  the  most  supported  option  for  public  expenditure  was  for  “educational  
programmes  that  help  young  people  to  get  rid  of  negative  stereotypes  and  to  understand  the  common  
interests  of  citizens  of  different  backgrounds”.  This  support  ranges  between  86.4%  for  the  age  group  
18-­30  to  91.5%  among  respondents  older  than  51.
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6LJQL¿FDQWVXSSRUWZDVDOVRJLYHQE\DOODJHJURXSVWRWKHLGHDRIVSHQGLQJSXEOLFIXQGVRQ³VRFLDO
and   cultural   programmes   focused  on  problems   relating   to   coexistence   in  Bosnia   and  Herzegovi-­
na”.  Here,  the  lowest  level  of  support  was  given  by  respondents  between  18  and  30  years  of  age  
(83.2%),  whereas  the  highest  level  of  support  came  from  those  respondents  who  were  younger  than  
18  (87.9%).
Those  younger  than  18  were  least  likely  to  spend  public  money  on  memorial  and  information  cen-­
tres  at  sites  of  serious  crimes  (55%),  and  most  likely  to  spend  it  on  educational  programmes  which  
help  young  people  to  get  rid  of  negative  stereotypes  (87.8%)  and  on  social  and  cultural  programmes  
focused  on  problems  relating  to  coexistence  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (87.9%).  The  same  trend  
is  seen  among  respondents  older  than  51,  who  were  also  most  likely  to  support  the  same  proposals  
(91.5%  and  87.2%  respectively).
The  age  cohort  which   included   the  highest  proportion  of   respondents  who  chose  not   to  give  an-­
VZHUVWR4XHVWLRQZDVEHWZHHQDQG\HDUVRIDJHEHWZHHQDQG5HÀHFWLQJ
DFRPPRQWUHQG\RXQJHUUHVSRQGHQWVVKRZHGOHVVFRQVLVWHQF\LQ¿OOLQJRXWWKHTXHVWLRQQDLUHDQG
generally  less  interest  for  the  topic,  although  they  were  most  frequent  to  volunteer  to  be  respondents.
When  asked  how  important  it  would  be  to  include  different  categories  of  citizens  in  a  process  of  rec-­
onciliation  designed  to  build  trust  and  understanding  across  the  population,  respondents  were  least  
OLNHO\WRDWWULEXWHDSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWWRSROLWLFLDQV1HYHUWKHOHVVDI¿UPHGWKDWLWLVYHU\LPSRU-­
tant  to  include  politicians  in  a  reconciliation  process,  21%  that  it  is  important,  18%  that  it  is  both  
important  and  unimportant,  unimportant  9%  and  completely  unimportant  21%.  This  was  the  largest  
proportion  of  negative  attitudes   to  any  type  of  actor  who  might  be   involved   in   the  reconciliation  
SURFHVV7KLVQHJDWLYHUHVSRQVHZDVSDUWLFXODUO\QRWLFHDEOHDPRQJ\RXQJHUUHVSRQGHQWVWKHOHYHO
of  importance  attributed  to  a  role  for  politicians  in  the  reconciliation  process  then  rose  steadily  with  
the  age  of  respondents.  The  same  trend  can  be  seen  in  relation  to  expectations  placed  on  religious  
¿JXUHVWHDFKHUVHVSHFLDOO\ORZO\UDQNHGE\WKRVH\RXQJHUWKDQDQGOD\EHOLHYHUV,QUHJDUGWR
other  suggested  options  (groups  representing  victims  and  the  vulnerable,  persons  representing  the  
interests  of  all  citizens),  there  is  a  similar  trend,  albeit  not  so  emphatic.  Respondents  younger  than  
18  attributed  more  importance  to  the  role  of  women  in  the  process  of  trust  building  than  other  age  
groups  did.
   61
     12.  Sex/Gender
  12.  Sex/Gender
7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIDWWHQWLRQWR WKHLQÀXHQFHRIVH[RUJHQGHURQDWWLWXGHVWRUHFRQFLOLDWLRQLVDF-­
knowledged  by  a  range  of  parties,  some  of  which  proceed  from  an  ‘essentialising’  assumption  about  
ZRPHQDVEHLQJLQKHUHQWO\SHDFHIXOLPPXQHWRWKHIDFWRUVZKLFKWXUQPHQLQWRDFWRUVLQDFRQÀLFW
8QGRXEWHGO\ZRPHQSOD\HGDQGFRQWLQXHWRSOD\SLRQHHULQJUROHVLQSURPRWLQJHQFRXQWHUDQGGL-­
alogue.  The  present  study  suggests  grounds  for  seeing  a  distinctive  dynamic  favouring  reconcilia-­
tion  activities  amongst  women  who  responded  to  the  survey,  and  there  were  also  some  noticeable  
divergences  between  the  tendencies  amongst  more  religious  and  more  secular  women.  It  is  not  the  
case  that  the  attitudes  of  men  and  women  should  be  seen  as  different,  but  a  number  of  features  of  
the  survey  ought  to  be  borne  in  mind  by  those  seeking  to  understand  how  ordinary  men  and  women  




citizen   in   reconciliation  and   trust  building   in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina   (Q27),   the   role  of  women  
was  recognized  as  very  important  by  33%,  and  important  by  30%  of  respondents.  Only  15%  of  re-­
spondents  indicated  that  the  role  of  women  is  not  important  in  processes  of  reconciliation  and  trust  
building.
Differences  between  men  and  women  in  response  to  questions  about  reconciliation
,QUHVSRQVHWRWKH¿UVWJURXSRITXHVWLRQV4DGGUHVVLQJZKDWLQLWLDWLYHVWKHSURFHVVRIUHFRQ-­
ciliation  should  entail,  the  average  of  the  sample  of  women  ranked  all  ten  listed  initiatives  as  more  
LPSRUWDQWWKDQPHQRQDYHUDJHGLGWKRXJKRQO\IRUKDOIRIWKHPZHUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHU-­
ences  found:
Ɣ in  indicating  the  importance  of  receiving  explanations  of  their  deeds  from  persons  responsible  
for  events  in  the  1990s,
Ɣ in  recognizing  the  importance  of  citizens  understanding  each  others’  different  views,
Ɣ in  encouraging  school  children  to  speak  about  expectations  for  the  future  which  they  share,
Ɣ in  appreciating  the  contribution  to  be  made  by  people  who  can  understand  the  views  of  mem-­
bers  of  other  communities,  and
Ɣ in  seeing  value  in  an  agreement  among  experts  regarding  reasons  for  actions  of  military  and  
SROLWLFDOOHDGHUGXULQJWKHFRQÀLFW
Although  women  on  average  ranked  the  importance  of  the  role  of  today’s  politicians  in  the  recon-­
ciliation  process  more  highly  than  men  did  on  average,  no  statistically  important  differences  were  
found.  Women  showed  higher   sensitivity   toward   the   role   to  be  played  by  “ordinary  people”,  yet  
also  tended  to  attribute  importance  to  politicians  from  the  past  explaining  their  own  deeds  as  well  
as  experts  agreeing  upon   the  deeds  of  military  and  political  elites  during   the  war.  Those  women  
who  supported  all  of  these  points  could  be  seen  as  more  aware  that  reconciliation  is  complex  social  
phenomena,  embracing  different  processes  which   include   the  contribution  of  ordinary  people,  of  
H[SHUWVRI\RXWKDQGRISHRSOHZKRWRRNGHFLVLRQVGXULQJWKHZDU,WDOVRVHHPVVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿-­
cant  differences  that  women  on  average  laid  more  importance  on  understanding  as  a  key  feature  of  
reconciliation  processes.
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For  Q25,  all  of  the  concrete  steps  listed  for  possible  priority  in  reconciliation  work  were  ranked  of  
KLJKHULPSRUWDQFHWRZRPHQRQDYHUDJHWKDQWRPHQRQDYHUDJH6WDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHV
were  found  on  the  following  points:
Ɣ providing  special  treatment  and  protection  for  minority  returnees
Ɣ mutual  understanding  and  respect  of  differences  among  citizens,  and
Ɣ mutual  understanding  and  respect  of  similarities  between  citizens  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.
More  political,  national  and  abstract  issues,  such  as  constitutional  reform,  agreement  regarding  his-­
torical  facts  and  apology  of  politicians  for  the  past  were  ranked  more  highly  by  women  on  average,  
EXWVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVZHUHQRWIRXQG7KLVPHDQWWKDWIRUWKLVJURXSRITXHVWLRQV
women  laid  higher  stress  on  average  on  the  issues  concerning  the  understanding  of  “ordinary  peo-­
ple”.
Although  more  women  on  average  than  men  approved  the  idea  that  the  public  means  should  be  spent  
on  memorial  and  public  centres  at  sites  where  the  most  disastrous  war  crimes  were  committed,  no  
statistically  importance  differences  were  found.  The  same  is  true  of  the  second  question  regarding  
educational  programs  visits  by  youth  groups  to  these  places.  It  seems  from  the  data  that  both  wom-­
en  and  men  see  such  activities  can  be  traumatic,  and  especially  for  young  people.  Only  concerning  
educational  programs  to  help  youth  overcome  mutual  prejudices  and  understand  common  interests  
RIDOOFLWL]HQVZHUHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVIRXQGEHWZHHQUHVSRQGHQWVRIWKHWZRVH[HV
In  addition,  public  spending  on  social  and  cultural  programs  focused  on  citizens  living  together  in  
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  was  supported  by  2.2%  more  women  than  men,  though  this  was  not  statis-­
WLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW
Q27  presented  a  group  of  questions  about  the  importance  (or  otherwise)  of  particular  social  groups  
in  the  processes  of  reconciliation.  On  average,  women  ranked  all  those  categories  mentioned  more  
KLJKO\WKDQPHQGLG±SROLWLFLDQVSURPLQHQWUHOLJLRXV¿JXUHVWHDFKHUVRUGLQDU\EHOLHYHUVSHUVRQV
that  opt  for  the  interests  of  all  citizens,  women,  and  groups  that  represent  victims  or  the  marginal-­
L]HG1HYHUWKHOHVVRQO\IRUWKHODVWWZRZDVWKLVVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW
Differences  between  more  religious  and  non-­religious  women
The  differences  of  emphasis  between  those  women  who  described  themselves  as  religious  and  those  
who  described  themselves  as  not  religious  were  clear  in  relation  to  some  questions,  but  far  from  all.  
Some  of  the  same  patterns  were  observed  in  measuring  how  frequently  or  infrequently  respondents  
indicated   that   they  attended   local   religious  communities,   though   there  were  some   intriguing  new  
patterns.
Religious  women  proved  more  content  with  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  than  non-­religious  wom-­
en  (Q19),  a  pattern  true  of  religious  and  non-­religious  men  as  well.  By  contrast,  differences  of  ap-­
proach  to  priorities  for  improving  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (economic,  social,  and  political,  
4ZHUHQHJOLJLEOH7KHUHZHUHQRVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHV4UHODWLQJWRWKHLPSRU-­
tance  of  trust  building  on  a  local  or  a  national  level,  although  more  religious  women  evidenced  more  
trust  in  these  processes  on  a  national  level  than  non-­religious  women  did,  and  less  trust  than  non-­reli-­
gious  women  on  a  local  level.  By  contrast,  on  average  religious  women  clearly  considered  the  wider  
regional  reconciliation  process,  including  Serbia  and  Croatia,  to  be  less  important  than  non-­religious  
ZRPHQGLGDQGWKLVGLIIHUHQFHZDVVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW0RUHUHOLJLRXVWKDQQRQUHOLJLRXVZRP-­
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en  thought  that  these  processes  should  focus  on  the  constituent  peoples  (Q22),  but  this  difference  of  
WHQGHQF\ZDVQRWVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW
The  sample  of  religious  women  proved  more  keen  on  average  to  indicate  that  issues  relating  to  the  
past  are  important  for  reconciliation  than  nonreligious  women  did  (Q24  and  Q25).  As  the  research  
team  investigates  this  further,  the  possibility  that  this  is  connected  with  religious  traditionalism,  with  
women  commonly  being  construed  as  guardians  of  the  memories  of  “our”  victims,  can  be  examined.  
Religious  women  were  more  likely  to  indicate  they  saw  it  as  important  that  experts  should  explain  
the  causes  of  the  war,  that  politicians  in  the  1990s  should  explain  their  deeds  publicly,  that  apologies  
for  war  crimes  be  made,  and  that  agreement  regarding  genocide  and  the  extent  to  which  all  war  sides  
suffered  be  sought.
For  most  questions  regarding  peace-­building  activities  which  address  present  and  future  concerns,  
QRVLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVZHUHIRXQG7KXVWKHDSSURDFKHVRIUHOLJLRXVDQGQRQUHOLJLRXVZRPHQ
roughly  correlated   in   relation   to   the   importance  of  mutual  understanding  of  both  differences  and  
similarities  between  citizens.  Naturally,   the   role  of   “ordinary  believers”  was  more  highly   ranked  
by  religious  women,  and  this  was  also  true  of  attitudes  to  the  importance  of  a  serious  engagement  
between  politicians  and  the  people  they  seek  to  represent.  Religious  women  also  display  more  trust  
in   the  role  of  religious  leaders   in   the  process  of  reconciliation  and  in  groups  that  present  victims  
and  marginalized  people.  On  the  other  categories  of  actor  raised  in  Q27,  there  were  no  statistically  
important  differences.
7XUQLQJWRWKHLPSDFWRILQYROYHPHQWLQUHOLJLRXVFRPPXQLWLHVWKHUHZHUHVRPHXQVXUSULVLQJUHÀHF-­
tions  of  the  same  distinctions  between  respondents  who  indicated  they  were  religious  and  those  who  
indicated  that  they  were  non-­religious,  and  there  were  intriguing  differences.  Women  active  in  local  
religious  communities  were  slightly  more  keen  (though  this  was  not  clear  enough  to  be  statistically  
VLJQL¿FDQWWRFODLPWKDWIRUWKHLPSURYHPHQWRIOLIHLQ%RVQLDDQG+HU]HJRYLQDLWLVLPSRUWDQWWR
improve  social  relations  and  to  bring  order  to  the  country’s  politics,  and  they  gave  less  importance  
to  economic  change  than  non-­religious  women  did  (Q20).  Women  who  are  active  in  local  religious  
communities  were  no  more   likely   than  other  women   to   consider   reconciliation   initiatives  on   the  
local  and  national  level  to  be  likely  to  produce  important  change  (Q21).  However,  religiously  active  
women  were  less  likely  to  consider  reconciliation  initiatives  on  regional  level  to  be  important,  and  
WKLVZDVVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQW7KH\DOVR4ZHUHOHVVLQFOLQHGWRLQGLFDWHWKDWWKHVHLQLWLDWLYHV
should  focus  on  the  constituent  peoples,  although  this  was  not  statistically  important  –  opening  an  in-­
triguing  possibility  for  further  examination  that  on  this  question  religion  and  religiosity  cuts  against  
the  drawing  of  exclusive  ethno-­national  boundaries  in  political  life.
:KDWZDVVLJQL¿FDQWZDVWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKZRPHQZKRDUHDFWLYHLQWKHOLIHRIWKHLUUHOLJLRXV
communities  were  unimpressed  by  the  importance  of  reconciliation  activities  focused  on  the  past  
4V7KLVFRQWUDVWVZLWKWKH¿JXUHVEDVHGRQGHFODUHGOHYHOVRIUHOLJLRVLW\WKHUHWKHPRUH
religious  a  respondent  claimed  she  was,  the  more  likely  she  was  to  support  activities  focus  on  facing  
the  past.
More  religiously-­active  women  gave  more  consideration  to  a  number  of  forward-­facing  activities  
than  religiously  non-­practicing  women  did,  such  as  serious  encounters  between  active  politicians,  
activities  promoted  by  people  who  are  sincere  believers,  and  activities  enabling  citizens  to  under-­
stand  each  other  better.  Differences  in  the  role  of  expert  are  not  statistically  important  between  wom-­
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en  who  are  religiously  observant  and  those  who  are  not,  which  means  that  generally  speaking,  both  
groups  expect  more  of  a  contribution  to  be  made  by  “ordinary”  people  than  they  do  by  experts.  It  is  
also  interesting  to  note  that  whereas  women  who  claim  to  be  religious  and  women  who  claim  to  be  
UHOLJLRXVO\DFWLYHWKH¿UVWJURXSUDQNHGPRUHWKHLVVXHVGHDOLQJZLWKWKHSDVWWKDQWKHVHFRQGRQH
5HJDUGLQJWKHQH[WJURXSRITXHVWLRQFRQFHUQLQJUHFRQFLOLDWLRQWKHREWDLQHGFRUUHODWLRQFRHI¿FLHQW
are  only  statistically   important   regarding   the  respect  of  both  similarities  and  differences  between  
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  citizens,  where  religiously  non-­practicing  women  considered  this  as  more  
important  than  religiously  active.  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  no  statistically  important  differ-­
ences  were  found  on  other  questions,  between  women  who  are  religiously  active  on  different  levels.
At  the  same  time,  religiously-­observant  women  considered  public  spending  on  memorial  centres  at  
sites  of  atrocities  to  be  more  important  than  religiously  non-­observant  women  did,  placed  greater  
weight  on  educational  programmes  that  enable  young  people  to  visit  such  places  in  order  to  better  
understand  the  past,  and  were  more  emphatic  about  increasing  support  to  victims.  On  other  issues  
FRYHUHGLQ4QRVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWGLIIHUHQFHVZHUHIRXQG1HYHUWKHOHVVLWLVQRWXQLPSRU-­
tant  that  religiously  observant  women  were  less  likely  to  emphasise  reconciliation  activities  focused  
on  the  problems  of  common  life  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.
As  for  the  importance  of  different  social  actors  in  reconciliation  activities  (Q27),  statistically  im-­
portant  differences  were  only  found  regarding  the  role  of  religious  leaders  and  lay  believers,  where,  
logically  enough,  women  who  are  religiously  observant  were  more   likely   to  appreciate   their   role  
than  non-­religious  women  were.
,QFRQFOXVLRQWKHHQWLUHVDPSOHPDOHDQGIHPDOHVHHVLQZRPHQDSRWHQWLDOO\VLJQL¿FDQWDFWRULQ
reconciliation  processes,   and  only  15%  of   respondents   ranked   their   role  as  not   important.  Wom-­
en  proved  more  likely  to  indicate  reconciliation  activities  are  important  than  men,  and  on  average  
women  appeared  more  likely  to  be  aware  of  the  complex  range  of  actors  who  could  be  important  in  
reconciliation  related  process.  And  while  there  were  differences  of  emphasis  between  religious  and  
non-­religious  women  –  notably  that  the  more  religious  women  claim  to  be,  the  more  emphasis  they  
placed  on  the  importance  of  addressing  issues  from  the  past  –  the  trends  were  often  not  statistically  
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